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Abstract
This thesis investigates artificial agents learning to make strategic decisions in
imperfect-information games. In particular, we introduce a novel approach to re-
inforcement learning from self-play.
We introduce Smooth UCT, which combines the game-theoretic notion of fic-
titious play with Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). Smooth UCT outperformed a
classic MCTS method in several imperfect-information poker games and won three
silver medals in the 2014 Annual Computer Poker Competition.
We develop Extensive-Form Fictitious Play (XFP) that is entirely implemented
in sequential strategies, thus extending this prominent game-theoretic model of
learning to sequential games. XFP provides a principled foundation for self-play
reinforcement learning in imperfect-information games.
We introduce Fictitious Self-Play (FSP), a class of sample-based reinforce-
ment learning algorithms that approximate XFP. We instantiate FSP with neural-
network function approximation and deep learning techniques, producing Neural
FSP (NFSP). We demonstrate that (approximate) Nash equilibria and their repre-
sentations (abstractions) can be learned using NFSP end to end, i.e. interfacing
with the raw inputs and outputs of the domain.
NFSP approached the performance of state-of-the-art, superhuman algorithms
in Limit Texas Hold’em - an imperfect-information game at the absolute limit of
tractability using massive computational resources. This is the first time that any re-
inforcement learning algorithm, learning solely from game outcomes without prior
domain knowledge, achieved such a feat.
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Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory.
Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.
— Sun Tzu
One day Alice came to a fork in the road and saw a Cheshire
cat in a tree. “Which road do I take?” she asked. “Where do
you want to go?” was his response. “I don’t know”, Alice
answered. “Then,” said the cat, “it doesn’t matter.”
— Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Games are domains of conflict or cooperation (Myerson, 1991) between decision-
making intelligences, who are termed agents. Our world is full of imperfect-
information games. Examples include airport security, traffic control, financial
trading, sales & marketing, tax evasion, sports and poker. This thesis addresses
the problem of artificial agents learning to make strategic decisions in imperfect-
information games.
Agents exist in an environment. An agent’s experience in its environment is a se-
quence of observations it perceives, actions it chooses, and rewards it receives. The
real-valued reward signal determines how the agent perceives its experience, e.g.
falling off a bike would be a painful, negative-reward experience. The observations
encode the information that the agent gathers via its senses, e.g. sight or touch but
also non-human senses such as a phone’s accelerometer. An agent’s goal is to max-
imise its total long-term reward. To achieve its goal it has to experientially learn a
policy for choosing optimal (reward-maximising) actions, which may include for-
going short-term reward to achieve higher long-term reward. For example, an agent
might try different restaurants and dishes on the menu instead of settling on a single
choice.
Reinforcement learning is a paradigm of goal-directed intelligent learning from
an agent’s experience (Sutton and Barto, 1998). A reinforcement-learning agent
is in charge of exploring its environment to gather the experience it may need for
learning a policy on its own. In particular, positive (negative) rewards reinforce
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(inhibit) the agent’s decisions. This could be described as trial-and-error learning.
Unlike in supervised learning, there is no external teacher1 who presents the agent
with the optimal action (label) for a given situation (input). Unlike in traditional
programming, the agent’s decisions are not hard-coded. These distinctive proper-
ties of reinforcement learning were key to achieving superhuman performance in
Backgammon (Tesauro, 1995), Go (Silver et al., 2016a), and Atari games (Mnih
et al., 2015).
Game theory is the classic science of strategic decision making in games. Strategic
decisions take into account the motives and intelligence of other agents, who might
be cooperative or adversarial. Game theorists have traditionally studied the decision
making of rational agents (Myerson, 1991). Rational agents maximise their rewards
and are assumed to have the ability to do so. A seminal game-theoretic result is that
every game has a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951), i.e. an assignment of policies
from which no rational agent would choose to deviate.
1.1 Strategic Decision Making
In a single-agent task, such as a robot lifting inanimate objects or a machine clas-
sifying images, the agent’s environment is usually assumed to be stationary, i.e. its
dynamics do not change if the task is repeated. This property is very useful to a
reinforcement learner, as it can gather experience from repeatedly performing the
task. In contrast, in a multi-agent game an agent’s decisions affect fellow agents’
experience, causing them to dynamically adapt their behaviour. Due to these recip-
rocal effects, experience of specific strategic scenarios can be scarce. This poses
significant challenges to experiential learning.
1.1.1 Adaptive (Exploitative) Approach
Consider an agent repeatedly playing a game against an opponent. Each round of
the game adds to the experience of both agents. In particular, the opponent will learn
from this experience and thus (indefinitely) alter its internal state, e.g. memory and
policy. Technically, as the opponent cannot be forced to forget the past, an agent
1A teacher could be encountered within the agent’s environment.
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can therefore never repeat the same iteration of the game against the same oppo-
nent. How could the agent still effectively learn from trial and error? It would have
to generalise from unique experiences. First, there might be generalisable patterns
in the opponent’s decision making that allow the agent to transfer knowledge across
the sequence of repeated games. This could be the case when the opponent is using
a simple heuristic or algorithm for making its decisions or when it has a bounded
memory or other limitations. Second, the agent could play against different oppo-
nents and attempt to generalise from these experiences. This would be possible if
there were (identifiable) groups of opponents that think similarly.
While the adaptive approach has the potential of being optimal, i.e. reward
maximising, it poses several challenges. First, acquiring experience and learning
from trial and error can be particularly costly in an adversarial game, such as airport
security or poker. Second, accelerating the experience acquisition by using data or
experience of other agents may not be an option for imperfect-information games.
Finally, a superior opponent, who learns faster, could outplay an adaptive agent by
anticipating its decisions. For example, by employing a theory of mind (Premack
and Woodruff, 1978), an opponent could be already thinking about what the agent
is thinking about him (Yoshida et al., 2008), i.e. the opponent’s decision making
would be one step ahead.
1.1.2 Static (Defensive) Approach
In a Nash equilibrium every agent is maximising its reward and therefore may as
well continue using its respective policy. Thus, a Nash equilibrium can be regarded
as a fixed point of multi-agent learning. In fact, by definition (Nash, 1951), Nash
equilibria are the only policies that rational agents can ever converge on.
What are the use cases of Nash equilibria? First, learning a Nash equilibrium,
in principle, only requires knowledge of the game’s rules or access to a black-box
simulator. In particular, no prior experience or domain knowledge is required. Sec-
ond, a Nash equilibrium may be predictive of sophisticated, i.e. approximately
rational, agents’ behaviour. This can be useful in designing multi-agent systems
that cannot be gamed, e.g. auctions (Roth, 2002) or blockchains (Nakamoto, 2008).
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Third, decentrally deployed cooperative agents are sometimes managed by a single
entity, e.g. a city’s traffic lights system. All optimal policies of these agents would
be Nash equilibria. The goal would be to find the best Nash equilibrium, i.e. a
global optimum. Fourth, in adversarial (two-player zero-sum) games Nash equilib-
ria offer attractive worst-case guarantees (Neumann, 1928). In particular, choosing
a Nash equilibrium is optimal against a worst-case opponent, i.e. an opponent that
always knows the agent’s policy and plays perfectly against it. This is useful in se-
curity domains, where an attacker might choose to only act on detected weaknesses
(Tambe, 2011). Furthermore, a Nash equilibrium is unbeatable (in expectation) in
alternating adversarial games, e.g. poker. Finally, a Nash equilibrium could be used
as an initial policy and then tailored to fellow agents by learning from experience
(Johanson et al., 2008). This could mitigate some of the costs of experience acqui-
sition (compare Section 1.1.1).
Using static Nash equilibria poses the following challenges. First, choosing a
policy from a Nash equilibrium is not always optimal. For example, an irrational
opponent might make mistakes that the agent could learn to exploit for higher re-
ward than a Nash equilibrium might offer (see Section 1.1.1). Also, in games with
more than two players (or general-sum games) all agents generally have to select the
same Nash equilibrium in order to be offered its optimality guarantees, e.g. if two
cooperative neighbouring city councils operate their own respective traffic lights
systems, they might have to coordinate on the same Nash equilibrium to achieve
optimal traffic flow. Second, the reward signals of fellow agents are subjective and
generally unperceivable by other agents. For instance, fellow agents’ reward signals
might encode individual, altruistic, moral and utilitarian motives (Hula et al., 2015).
Therefore, a Nash equilibrium of a subjective model of a game might be unapplica-
ble to the environment if the assumed rewards do not match the real reward signals
of fellow agents. This is less of an issue for purely adversarial games, such as poker,
football or tax evasion, where the opponent’s reward might just be assumed to be
the negative of the relevant agent’s reward. In this case, a Nash equilibrium would
offer the typical worst-case guarantees with respect to the relevant agent’s reward
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signal, e.g. breaking even in symmetric or alternating games.
1.1.3 Self-Play
Self-play is the activity of imagining or simulating the play of a game against one-
self. For instance, a human agent could sit down in front of a chess board and play
out game positions either mentally or physically on the board. This educational ac-
tivity yields experience that humans can learn from. Similarly, an artificial agent can
learn from self-play (Shannon, 1950; Samuel, 1959). Many practical successes of
artificial intelligence in games have been based on self-play (Tesauro, 1995; Veness
et al., 2009; Bowling et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016a).
Self-play can be alternatively interpreted as a fictitious interaction of multiple
agents. This is because a self-playing agent would have to imagine itself as each
player2 in the game, taking into account the respective players’ private information
that would be available only to them in an imperfect-information game. This is
technically equivalent to imagining multiple agents interacting in the game. There-
fore, our discussion of Nash equilibria as fixed points of multi-agent learning (see
Section 1.1.2) also applies to self-play. In particular, Nash equilibria are the only
policies that rational learning from self-play can converge on (Bowling and Veloso,
2001). Vice versa, Nash equilibria can, in principle, be learned from self-play.
1.2 Research Question
Our overall goal is to answer the question,
Can an agent feasibly learn approximate Nash equilibria of large-scale
imperfect-information games from self-play?
1.2.1 Motivation
Real-world games are typically large-scale and only partially observable, requiring
agents to make decisions under imperfect information. By large-scale, we mean
the game to have a variety of situations that cannot be exhaustively enumerated with
2 A game’s player is merely the specification of a role. This role can be implemented by an agent.
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reasonable computational resources. In particular, specific actions for each situation
cannot be feasibly provided by a lookup table.
We have established the utility of Nash equilibria in Section 1.1.2. In large-
scale games we generally have to settle for an approximate Nash equilibrium, i.e.
an assignment of policies from which agents have little incentive to deviate.
1.2.2 Related Work
In this section we discuss prior work related to our research question, focusing on
the respective aspects that have not fully addressed our question.
Optimisation Nash equilibria have been traditionally computed by mathematical
programming techniques (Koller et al., 1996; Gilpin et al., 2007; Hoda et al., 2010;
Bosansky et al., 2014). An advantage of some of these methods is that they produce
a perfect equilibrium. However, these methods generally need to enumerate and
encode the various aspects of a game and thus do not apply to large-scale games.
Fictitious play (Brown, 1951) is a classic game-theoretic model of learning from
self-play (Robinson, 1951; Fudenberg and Levine, 1995; Monderer and Shapley,
1996; Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002; Leslie and Collins, 2006). Fictitious players
repeatedly play a game, at each iteration choosing the best policy in hindsight. This
is quite similar to how a reinforcement learner might act. However, fictitious play
has been mainly studied in single-step games, which can only inefficiently represent
sequential, multi-step games (Kuhn, 1953). A sequential variant of fictitious play
was introduced but lacks convergence guarantees in imperfect-information games
(Hendon et al., 1996).
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2007) is a full-
width3 self-play approach guaranteed to converge in sequential adversarial (two-
player zero-sum) games. Monte Carlo CFR (MCCFR) (Lanctot et al., 2009) extends
CFR to learning from sampled subsets of game situations. Outcome Sampling (OS)
(Lanctot et al., 2009; Lisy´ et al., 2015) is an MCCFR variant that samples single
game trajectories. It can be regarded as an experiential, reinforcement learning
method. However, OS, MCCFR and CFR are all table-lookup approaches that lack
3 Generally, each iteration has to consider all game situations or actions.
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the ability to learn abstract patterns and use them to generalise to novel situations,
which is essential in large-scale games. An extension of CFR to function approxi-
mation (Waugh et al., 2015) is able to learn such patterns but has not been combined
with sampling. Therefore, it still needs to enumerate all game situations. Finally,
the aforementioned CFR variants, except OS, are unsuitable for agent-based learn-
ing from experience.
CFR-based methods have essentially solved two-player Limit Texas Hold’em
poker (Bowling et al., 2015) and produced a champion program for the No-Limit
variant (Brown et al., 2015). Both of these games can be considered large-scale.
However, in order to achieve computational tractability, a model of the game had
to be exploited with domain-specific human-engineered routines, e.g. compression
techniques, abstractions and massive distributed computing. In contrast, an agent
would learn solely from its experience and generalise to unseen situations rather
than exhaustively enumerate them. Such an agent may also be versatilely applied
to other games by connecting it to the respective environments’ streams of observa-
tions, actions and rewards.
Abstraction The limited scalability of CFR and mathematical programming meth-
ods has traditionally been circumvented by solving abstractions of games. An ab-
straction reduces the game to a manageable size. Forming an abstraction generally
requires prior domain knowledge (experience). In early work on computer poker
(Billings et al., 2003; Zinkevich et al., 2007; Johanson et al., 2012), agents did not
learn abstractions from their own experience. Instead they were injected with a
hard-coded abstraction, which was handcrafted based on human domain expertise.
Apart from the resource requirements for creating such abstractions, hard-coded
abstraction can eternally bias an agent and prevent it from achieving its goals. In
particular, handcrafted abstractions can result in unintuitive pathologies of agents’
policies (Waugh et al., 2009a). Recent work (Sandholm and Singh, 2012; Kroer and
Sandholm, 2014; Brown and Sandholm, 2015) has explored automated abstraction
techniques, which refine an abstraction during training based on (computed) game
outcomes. Similarly, an end-to-end approach to experiential learning from self-play
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could allow an agent to learn both the game’s optimal (Nash equilibrium) policy as
well as a suitable game abstraction (features) to represent it.
Reinforcement learning has been successful in learning end to end (Riedmiller,
2005; Heess et al., 2012; Mnih et al., 2015, 2016), i.e. interfacing with the raw
stream of the environment’s observations, actions, and rewards. Many applications
of experiential learning from self-play can be well described as reinforcement learn-
ing. In adversarial games, agents try to maximise (minimise) their own (opponents’)
rewards in a Minimax fashion (Shannon, 1950; Littman, 1996). While classical re-
inforcement learning methods have achieved high-quality solutions to recreational,
perfect-information games (Tesauro, 1995; Veness et al., 2009; Silver et al., 2016a),
these methods fail to converge (on Nash equilibria) in imperfect-information games
(Ponsen et al., 2011; Lisy´, 2014) (see Appendix A). However, for the adaptive ap-
proach to strategic decision making (see Section 1.1.1) convergence to Nash equi-
libria is not required. In this case, the problem reduces to a Markov decision process
(MDP) (technically, a single-agent domain) for which reinforcement learning offers
convergence guarantees (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Regarding learning from self-
play, Leslie and Collins (2006) introduced a reinforcement learning algorithm that
implements (approximate) fictitious play in single-step games and thus offers its
convergence guarantees.
1.3 Approach
This section describes the recurring theme of this thesis and the specific steps we
take towards answering our research question.
1.3.1 Theme
We craft a novel approach to learning from self-play, by combining the strengths
of reinforcement learning (sequential experiential learning) and fictitious play (con-
vergence on Nash equilibria). This is motivated by a striking similarity between
the concepts of fictitious play and reinforcement learning. Both techniques con-
sider agents who choose policies that are best in hindsight, i.e. according to their
experience.
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We develop and evaluate our methods in poker games, which have traditionally
exemplified the challenges of strategic decision making (Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern, 1944; Kuhn, 1950; Nash, 1951; Billings et al., 2002; Sandholm, 2010;
Rubin and Watson, 2011; Bowling et al., 2015).
1.3.2 Outline
We proceed as follows:
• Chapter 2 reviews the literature and background material that we build upon.
• Chapter 3 presents a case study of introducing the notion of fictitious play
into a reinforcement learning algorithm. The resulting approach, Smooth
UCT, significantly improves on the original algorithm’s convergence in self-
play and was successful in the Annual Computer Poker Competition (ACPC)
2014.
• Chapter 4 extends fictitious play to sequential games, preserving its conver-
gence guarantees. The resulting full-width approach, Extensive-Form Ficti-
tious Play (XFP), provides a principled foundation for reinforcement learning
from self-play.
• Chapter 5 extends XFP to learning from sampled experience. The resulting
approach, Fictitious Self-Play (FSP), utilises standard supervised and rein-
forcement learning techniques for approximating (sequential) fictitious play.
• Chapter 6 addresses practical issues of FSP by instantiating it with deep learn-
ing techniques. The resulting approach, Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP),
has enabled agents to experientially learn a near state-of-the-art policy for a
large-scale poker game from self-play. This result provides an answer to the
research question of the thesis.
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
2.1 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning is the science of optimal sequential decision making in the
presence of a reward feedback signal. A reinforcement learning agent is not gen-
erally presented a desired or optimal action (output) for a given situation (input).
Instead it needs to discover desired solutions from its own or others’ experience of
interacting with its domain. A real-valued reward signal provides the agent with
feedback on its choices and experience. A common goal for the agent is to learn an
optimal policy that maximises its expected total reward.
2.1.1 Task
A reinforcement learning agent exists in an environment that it can interact with.
At each each time step t the learning agent perceives the current observation
Ot ∈ O and then chooses an action At ∈ A from a set of available actions. Af-
ter performing its action, which generally has an effect on the environment, the
agent experiences a reward Rt+1 ∈ R and its next observation Ot+1 of the envi-
ronment. The sequence of observations, actions and rewards constitutes the agent’s
experience. The agent’s information state Ut ∈U is a (possibly sufficient) statis-
tic of the agent’s past experience. A policy, pi(a |u), is a probability distribution
over available actions given information states. In a finite, episodic task, the agent
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strives to maximise its return1, Gt =∑Tk=t Rk+1, by learning an optimal policy from
its experience.
A reinforcement learning task has been traditionally formulated as a Markov
decision process (MDP) (Puterman, 1994; Sutton and Barto, 1998). A MDP
consists of a set of Markov states S , a set of actions A and probability
distributions that determine its dynamics. The transition function, Pass′ =
P(St+1 = s′ |St = s,At = a), determines the probability of transitioning to state
s′ after taking action a in state s. Rewards are emitted from a conditional prob-
ability distribution with expected values determined by the reward function,
Rass′ = E [Rt+1 |St = s,At = a,St+1 = s′].
A MDP defines a perfect-information, stationary environment. In this envi-
ronment the agent observes the MDP’s Markov state, Ot = St , which is a sufficient
statistic of the agent’s past experience,
P(ot+1,rt+1 |o1,a1, ...,ot ,at) = P(ot+1,rt+1 |ot ,at) .
In MDP environments we usually do not distinguish between the environment state
and the agent’s information state and observation, as we assume them to be equal,
St =Ut = Ot .
A partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) (Kaelbling
et al., 1998) extends the MDP model to environments that are not fully observable.
In addition to the components of an MDP, a POMDP contains a set of observa-
tions O and an observation function Zso = P(Ot = o |St = s) that determines the
probability of observing o in state s.
A POMDP defines an imperfect-information, stationary environment. In this
environment the agent only receives a partial observation of the underlying MDP’s
state. In principle, the agent can remember the full history of past observations and
1 In this thesis, we restrict our presentation and use of reinforcement learning to episodic tasks
and thus ignore the common discount factor that is convenient for non-episodic tasks.
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actions, which by definition is a sufficient statistic of its experience and thus an ideal
information state,
Ut = O1A1O2...At−1Ot . (2.1)
The POMDP can be reduced to a standard, perfect-information MDP by redefining
it over these full-history information states and extending the respective transition
and reward functions (Silver and Veness, 2010).
2.1.2 Value Functions
Many reinforcement learning methods learn to predict the expected return of the
agent (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
The state-value function, V pi : U → R, maps an information state u to the
expected return from following policy pi after experiencing u,
V pi(u) = Epi [Gt |Ut = u] , (2.2)
where Epi denotes the expectation with the agent’s actions, {Ak}k≥t , and thus sub-
sequent experience sampled from policy pi .
The action-value function, Qpi :U ×A → R, maps information state-action
pairs (u,a) to the expected return from taking action a in information state u and
following policy pi thereafter,
Qpi(u,a) = Epi [Gt |Ut = u,At = a] . (2.3)
Full-Width Updates A key ingredient of many reinforcement learning algorithms
are the Bellman equations (Bellman, 1957). They relate the values of subsequent
states. For MDPs, where the agent’s information states are equivalent to the MDP’s
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Markov states, we can derive the Bellman equations,
V pi(u) = Epi
[
T
∑
k=t
Rk+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ut = u
]
= Epi
[
Rt+1+
T
∑
k=t+1
Rk+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ut = u
]
= ∑
a∈A
pi(a |u) ∑
u′∈U
Pauu′
(
Rauu′+E
pi
[
T
∑
k=t+1
Rk+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ut+1 = u′
])
= ∑
a∈A
pi(a |u) ∑
u′∈U
Pauu′
(
Rauu′+V
pi(u′)
)
. (2.4)
The Bellman equations define a full-width update of a state value from its subse-
quent state values,
V pi(u)← ∑
a∈A
pi(a |u) ∑
u′∈U
Pauu′
(
Rauu′+V
pi(u′)
)
(2.5)
This update requires knowledge or a model of the MDP dynamics.
Similar equations and full-width updates can be derived for the action-value
function,
Qpi(u,a) = ∑
u′∈U
Pauu′
(
Rauu′+ ∑
a∈A
pi(a |u′)Q(u′,a)
)
. (2.6)
Sampled Updates Consider the problem of estimating a state or action value from
sampled experience, without requiring a model of the environment’s dynamics.
Assume an episodic environment and consider experience sampled from fol-
lowing a policy pi . Then the sampled return after visiting information state Ut at
time t,
Gt =
T
∑
k=t
Rk+1, (2.7)
is an unbiased estimate of the state value, V pi (Ut). Monte Carlo methods accumu-
late these sampled returns to update the value function
V (Ut)←V (Ut)+αt(Gt−V (Ut)), (2.8)
where αt is some scalar step-size that can be time- and state-dependent.
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Especially if a state’s value depends on many subsequent actions and delayed
rewards, sampled returns can have high variance. By bootstrapping value function
updates from current value estimates, temporal-difference methods reduce vari-
ance at the cost of introducing bias (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Considering the Bellman equation,
V pi(Ut) = Epi [Gt ] = Epi [Rt+1+V pi(Ut+1)] , (2.9)
we can replace samples of Gt with Rt +V pi(Ut+1). Temporal-difference learn-
ing (Sutton, 1988) uses the current estimate V (Ut+1) of V pi(Ut+1) to perform the
following update
V (Ut)←V (Ut)+αt (Rt +V (Ut+1)−V (Ut)) . (2.10)
As V (Ut+1) is an approximation, this update uses a biased estimate of the target
value. The difference
δt = Rt +V (Ut+1)−V (Ut) (2.11)
is the temporal-difference error. Temporal-difference learning minimises the ex-
pected temporal-difference error by incrementally matching values of subsequent
states.
2.1.3 Policy Evaluation and Policy Improvement
The preceding section discussed estimating values of single states or state-action
pairs. In order to guide sequential decision making in the whole environment, it is
useful to estimate the policy’s value function for all states. This is known as policy
evaluation (Sutton and Barto, 1998). After evaluating a policy pi , i.e. computing
the value function V pi or Qpi , the policy can be improved by raising its probability
of taking actions that are predicted to lead to higher returns. In particular, for an
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evaluated action-value function, Qpi , greedy policy improvement
pi ′(a|u) =
1 for a = argmaxa′Q
pi(u,a′)
0 otherwise
(2.12)
is guaranteed to improve the agent’s performance, i.e. V pi
′
(u) ≥ V pi(u) ∀s ∈ S
(Bellman, 1957). For any MDP there are unique optimal value functions,
V ∗(u) = max
pi
V pi(u) ∀u ∈U , (2.13)
Q∗(u,a) = max
pi
Qpi(u,a) ∀(u,a) ∈U ×A , (2.14)
that cannot be further improved (Sutton and Barto, 1998). An optimal policy, pi∗,
is any policy that only takes actions of maximum value,
pi∗(a |u)> 0→ Q∗(u,a) = max
a′
Q∗(u,a′), (2.15)
and thus maximises the agent’s expected total reward.
Policy iteration (Bellman, 1957; Puterman and Shin, 1978) alternates policy
evaluation with policy improvement. In particular, for a known model of the MDP
we can evaluate a policy by repeatedly applying the full-width update (2.5) to all
states. Under appropriate conditions, the Banach fixed-point theorem ensures con-
vergence of this procedure to the value function of the evaluated policy. Alternating
this policy evaluation procedure with greedy policy improvement converges to the
optimal value function (Puterman and Shin, 1978). In general, we do not need to
wait for policy evaluation to converge before improving the policy. Value iteration,
V k+1(u)←max
a∈A ∑u′∈U
Pauu′
(
Rauu′+V
k(u′)
)
∀u ∈U , (2.16)
also converges to the optimal value function (under appropriate conditions) and
performs both (approximate) policy evaluation and greedy policy improvement in
one step (Puterman and Shin, 1978). In an episodic MDP that can be represented
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by a finite tree, there is no need to iteratively apply the value iteration algorithm.
If the computation is started from the leaves of the tree, one pass over all values
of the tree is sufficient to compute the optimal value function. Value iteration is
one example of Generalised Policy Iteration (GPI), a fundamental principle that
underlies many reinforcement learning methods (Sutton and Barto, 1998). GPI de-
scribes the concept of interleaving potentially partial policy evaluation with policy
improvement.
Whereas (full-width) policy and value iteration update all states of the envi-
ronment at each iteration, sample-based methods selectively apply their updates to
states that were experienced by an agent interacting with the environment. On-
policy agents evaluate the same policy that they use for sampling their experience.
In the off-policy setting an agent evaluates its policy from experience that was
sampled from a different policy, possibly even by a different agent. Q-learning
(Watkins, 1989) is a popular off-policy temporal-difference learning algorithm. It
evaluates the greedy policy by temporal-difference learning (2.10) from sampled
experience tuples, (Ut ,At ,Rt+1,Ut+1),
Q(Ut ,At)← Rt+1+max
a∈A
Q(Ut+1,a).
The experience can be sampled from any policy without biasing the update. This
is because both random variables, Ut+1,Rt+1, of the update are determined by the
environment. A common approach is to sample experience from an exploratory
ε-greedy policy, which chooses a random action with probability ε and the ac-
tion of highest estimated value otherwise. This ensures that all states are visited
and evaluated, enabling Q-learning to converge to the optimal policy (Watkins and
Dayan, 1992). Vanilla Q-learning updates the value function after each transition in
the environment in an online fashion. Fitted Q Iteration (FQI) (Ernst et al., 2005) is
a batch reinforcement learning (Lange et al., 2012) method that applies Q-learning
to past, memorized experience (Lin, 1992).
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2.1.4 Function Approximation
In domains with a very large or continuous state space, learning a separate value for
each state can be unfeasible. However, there might be similarities between states
leading to similar values. Generalising learned values across states could increase
learning performance.
One way to achieve generalisation is to approximate the value function by a
simpler function of the agent’s information state. In order to define such functions,
we need to encode the agent’s state appropriately. A common choice is to represent
the information state u as a vector of features, φ(u) ∈ Rn. Examples of features
include the agent’s sensor reading, e.g. the pixels it observes on a screen (Mnih
et al., 2015), or a binary k-of-n encoding of the cards it is holding in a card game.
A linear function approximator represents the value of a state as a linear
combination
V (u ;θ) = θTφ(u), (2.17)
where θ ∈Rn is a learned weight vector. State aggregation is a special linear func-
tion approximator that encodes each state as a unit vector with exactly one non-zero
element. Table lookup is a special case of state aggregation, that encodes each
state uniquely and thus represents the value of each state separately. The repre-
sentational power of a linear function approximator is limited by the quality of the
features. A multi-layer perceptron is a common feedforward neural network
(Bengio, 2009; Schmidhuber, 2015) and a universal function approximator capable
of approximating any continuous function on a compact subset of Rn (Cybenko,
1989). It performs successive stages (layers) of computation. Each layer k is pa-
rameterized by a weight matrix W k and a bias vector bk and transforms the previous
layer’s output xk−1 to an output vector
xk = ρ
(
W kxk−1+bk
)
,
where ρ is a usually non-linear activation function, e.g. rectified linear ρ(x) =
max(0,x). Each row of this computation, xki = ρ
(
W ki x
k−1+bki
)
, models an artifical
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neuron. A rectified linear unit (ReLU) is an artificial neuron activated by a rectified
linear function. When approximating a value function, the neural network would
map the agent’s feature vector, x0 = φ(u), to the approximated value of the state,
V (u ;θ) = xn, where xn is the final layer’s output and θ = {W 1, ...,W n,b1, ...,bn} is
the set of network parameters. In particular,
V (u ;θ) =W 2ρ
(
W 1φ(u)+b1
)
+b2, (2.18)
specifies a single-layer perceptron approximation of a value function.
In principle, we could approximately evaluate a policy by Stochastic Gradient
Descent (SGD) on the mean squared error objective
L pi (θ) = Epi
[
(V pi(Ut)−V (Ut ;θ))2
]
. (2.19)
This is a supervised learning formulation of policy evaluation that requires knowl-
edge of the target value function (labels), V pi . In practice, we substitute these opti-
mal targets with sampled or biased targets,
Vˆt =

∑a∈A pi(a |Ut)∑u∈U PaUtu
(
RaUtu+V (u ;θ)
)
(DP)
Gt (MC)
Rt+1+V (Ut+1 ;θ) (TD)
(2.20)
Temporal-difference learning (Sutton, 1988) stochastically optimises the squared
temporal-difference error (compare Equation 2.11) with sampled gradient updates,
θ ← θ +αt
(
Vˆt−V (Ut ;θ)
)
∇θV (Ut ;θ)
= θ +αt (Rt+1+V (Ut+1 ;θ)−V (Ut ;θ))∇θV (Ut ;θ).
On-policy linear temporal-difference learning (Sutton, 1988, 1996) uses linear func-
tion approximation and is guaranteed to converge to a bounded region of the de-
sired value function (Gordon, 2001). On the other hand, off-policy and non-linear
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temporal-difference learning were shown to diverge in counter examples (Baird
et al., 1995; Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 1997). In practice, temporal-difference learning
with neural network function approximation was incredibly successful in a variety
of applications (Tesauro, 1992; Lin, 1992; Mnih et al., 2015). Neural Fitted Q It-
eration (NFQ) (Riedmiller, 2005) and Deep Q Network (DQN) (Mnih et al., 2015)
are extensions of FQI that use neural network function approximation with batch
and online (fitted) Q-learning updates respectively. These approaches are consid-
ered to stabilise reinforcement learning with neural-network function approxima-
tion. In particular, they break the correlation of online updates through experience
replay (Lin, 1992; Riedmiller, 2005; Mnih et al., 2015). Furthermore, they reduce
non-stationarity through fitted target (see Equation 2.20) network parameters (Ried-
miller, 2005; Mnih et al., 2015).
2.1.5 Exploration and Exploitation
In order to fully evaluate its policy an agents needs to explore all states and actions in
the environment. On the other hand, in order to perform well the agent must choose
actions of highest (estimated) value. The agent faces the following dilemma. While
exploitation of current knowledge, e.g. value function, achieves higher short-term
reward, exploration of the environment acquires new knowledge that could result
in more reward in the long term.
A simple approach for trading off exploitation against exploration is the
ε-greedy policy, which chooses a random action with probability ε and the action
of highest estimated value otherwise,
ε-greedy [Q] (a |u) =
1− ε+
ε
|A (u)| , a = argmaxa′∈A (u)Q(u,a)
ε
|A (u)| , a 6= argmaxa′∈A (u)Q(u,a)
A more sophisticated approach, that uses the scale of the estimated action values to
inform exploration, is the Boltzmann policy,
Boltzmann [Q] (a |u) = exp
Q(u,a)
τ
∑a′∈A exp
Q(u,a′)
τ
,
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where the temperature τ controls the randomness of the policy. In practice, the
ε-greedy and Boltzmann policies’ exploration parameters, ε and τ respectively, are
reduced over time to focus the policy on the highest-value actions. This idea is
related to the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty, which prescribes
adjusting exploration of actions with the degree of uncertainty of their values. In
a stationary environment, values become more certain over time and therefore ex-
ploration can be reduced. The Upper Confidence Bounds (UCB) algorithm (Auer
et al., 2002) is a principled approach to optimism in the face of uncertainty for (non-
adversarial) multi-armed bandit problems (Lai and Robbins, 1985), i.e. single-state
MDPs. UCB applies exploration bonuses, derived from confidence bounds, to ac-
tions in proportion to their uncertainty, and maximises the resulting values,
at = argmax
a
Qt(a)+
√
2logNt
Nt(a)
, (2.21)
where Nt(a) counts the number of times action a has been chosen, Nt = t is the total
number of plays and Qt(a) is the mean reward from choosing action a.
2.1.6 Monte Carlo Tree Search
Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) (Coulom, 2006; Kocsis and Szepesva´ri, 2006;
Browne et al., 2012) is a class of simulation-based search algorithms, many of
which apply Monte Carlo reinforcement learning to local search trees (Silver, 2009).
The following properties render MCTS applicable to large-scale environments. By
planning online, it can focus its search effort on a relevant (local) subset of states.
Instead of a full-width evaluation of the local subtree, as e.g. in Minimax search,
MCTS selectively samples trajectories of the game and thus mitigates the curse
of dimensionality. These simulations are guided by an action-selection policy that
explores the most promising regions of the state space. The search tree is incre-
mentally expanded across explored states, which produces a compact, asymmetric
search tree.
A MCTS algorithm requires the following components. Given a state and ac-
tion, a black box simulator of the game samples a successor state and reward. A
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reinforcement learning algorithm uses simulated trajectories and outcomes (re-
turns) to update statistics at visited nodes in the search tree. A tree policy chooses
actions based on a node’s statistics. A rollout policy determines default behaviour
for states that are out of the scope of the search tree.
a
o
a
a
o o o
a
o
a a
a aaa
o'
root
terminal state
action node
observation/state node
default rollout policy
Figure 2.1: MCTS schematic
For a specified amount of planning
time the algorithm repeats the following. It
starts each Monte Carlo simulation at the
root node and follows its tree policy until ei-
ther reaching a terminal state or the bound-
ary of the search tree. Leaving the scope
of the search tree, the rollout policy is used
to play out the simulation until reaching a
terminal state. In this case, the tree is ex-
panded by a state node where the simula-
tion left the tree. This approach selectively
grows the tree in areas that are frequently
encountered in simulations. After reaching
a terminal state, the rewards are propagated back so that each visited state node can
update its statistics.
Common MCTS keeps track of the following node values. N(u) is the number
of visits by a Monte-Carlo simulation to node u. N(u,a) counts the number of times
action a has been chosen at node u. Q(u,a) is the estimated value of choosing
action a at node u. The action value estimates are usually updated by Monte Carlo
evaluation,
Q(u,a) =
1
N(u,a)
N(u,a)
∑
k=1
G(u,k),
where G(u,k) is the k-th return experienced from state u.
Kocsis and Szepesva´ri (2006) suggested using UCB to select actions in the
Monte Carlo search tree. The resulting MCTS method, UCB Applied to Trees
(UCT), selects greedily between action values that have been enhanced by an ex-
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ploration bonus,
pitree(s) = argmax
a
Q(s,a)+ c
√
logN(s)
N(s,a)
. (2.22)
The exploration bonus parameter c adjusts the balance between exploration and
exploitation. For suitable c, UCT converges to optimal policies in Markovian envi-
ronments (Kocsis and Szepesva´ri, 2006). The appropriate scale of c depends on the
size of the rewards.
Other MCTS methods have been proposed in the literature. Silver and Ve-
ness (2010) adapt MCTS to POMDPs and prove convergence given a true initial
belief state. Auger (2011) and Cowling et al. (2012) extend MCTS to imperfect-
information games and use the regret-minimising bandit method EXP3 (Auer et al.,
1995) for action selection. Lisy et al. (2013) prove convergence of MCTS in
simultaneous-move games for regret-minimising tree policies, including the EXP3
variant. Cowling et al. (2015) propose MCTS methods for inference in multi-player
imperfect-information games. Lisy´ et al. (2015) introduce Online Outcome Sam-
pling, an online MCTS variant that is guaranteed to converge in two-player zero-
sum imperfect-information games. Ponsen et al. (2011) compared the full-game
search performance of Outcome Sampling and UCT in a poker game. They con-
cluded that UCT quickly finds a good but suboptimal policy, while Outcome Sam-
pling initially learns more slowly but converges to the optimal policy over time.
2.2 Game Theory
Game theory is the science of strategic decision making in multi-agent scenarios.
2.2.1 Extensive-Form Games
Extensive-form games (Kuhn, 1953; Myerson, 1991) are a model of multiple play-
ers’ sequential interaction. The representation is based on a game tree and consists
of the following components: N = {1, ...,n} denotes the set of players. S is a set
of states corresponding to nodes in a finite rooted game tree. For each state node
s ∈S the edges to its successor states define a set of actions A (s) available to a
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player or chance in state s. The player function P :S →N ∪{c}, with c denot-
ing chance, determines who is to act at a given state. Chance may be considered a
particular player that follows a fixed randomized strategy that determines the distri-
bution of chance events at chance nodes. For each player i there is a corresponding
set of information statesU i and an information function Ii :S →U i that deter-
mines which states are indistinguishable for the player by mapping them onto the
same information state u ∈U i. In this dissertation, we mostly assume games with
perfect recall, i.e. each player’s current information state uit implies knowledge of
the sequence of his information states and actions, ui1,a
i
1,u
i
2,a
i
2, ...,u
i
t , that led to
this information state. The return function R :S → Rn maps terminal states to a
vector whose components correspond to each player’s return. A game is zero-sum
if and only if the sum of all players’ returns is always zero, i.e. ∑i∈N Ri(s) = 0 for
all terminal states s.
By composing (surjective) functions, f iA : S
i → S˜ i ⊆ S i, with the game’s
information functions, Ii, we obtain alternative information functions, I˜i = f iA ◦ Ii,
that induce an (information-state) abstraction of the extensive-form game. This
is conceptually equivalent to introducing state-aggregating function approximators
(Section 2.1.4) for each player.
A player’s behavioural strategy, pi i(a |ui), is a probability distribution over
actions given information states, and Σi is the set of all behavioural strategies of
player i. A strategy profile pi =(pi1, ...,pin) is a collection of strategy for all players.
pi−i refers to all strategies in pi except pi i.
2.2.2 Nash Equilibria
By extension of the return function R, Ri(pi) is the expected return of player i if
all players follow the strategy profile pi . For ε ≥ 0, the set of ε-best responses of
player i to their opponents’ strategies pi−i,
BRiε(pi
−i) =
{
pi i ∈ Σi : Ri(pi i,pi−i)≥ max
pi ′∈Σi
Ri(pi ′,pi−i)− ε
}
, (2.23)
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contains all strategies which achieve an expected return against pi−i that is sub-
optimal by no more than ε . The set of best responses, BRi(pi−i) = BRi0(pi
−i),
contains all optimal strategies against pi−i. A Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951) of an
extensive-form game is a strategy profile pi such that pi i ∈ BRi(pi−i) for all i ∈N ,
i.e. a strategy profile from which no return-maximising player would choose to de-
viate. An ε-Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile pi such that pi i ∈ BRiε(pi−i) for
all i ∈N .
For a two-player zero-sum game, we say that a strategy profile pi is exploitable
by an amount ε if and only if
ε =
R1
(
BR1(pi2),pi2
)
+R2
(
pi1,BR2(pi1)
)
2
.
Exploitability measures how well a worst-case opponent would perform by best
responding to the strategy profile. In two-player zero-sum games Nash equilibria
have attractive worst-case guarantees.
Theorem 2.2.1 (Minimax (Neumann, 1928)). For any two-player zero-sum game,
there is a value v ∈ R such that
max
pi1∈Σ1
min
pi2∈Σ2
R1(pi1,pi2) = min
pi2∈Σ2
max
pi1∈Σ1
R1(pi1,pi2) = v
Thus, playing a Nash equilibrium strategy guarantees player 1 (player 2) at
least the game’s unique value v (−v). Hence, a Nash equilibrium is unexploitable,
i.e. has zero exploitability. In general-sum and multi-player games different Nash
equilibria can result in different expected returns.
2.2.3 Normal Form
An extensive-form game induces an equivalent normal-form game as follows
(Kuhn, 1953; Myerson, 1991). For each player i ∈ N their deterministic be-
havioural strategies, ∆ip ⊂ Σi, define a set of normal-form actions, called pure
strategies. Restricting the extensive-form return function R to pure strategy pro-
files yields an (expected) return function for the normal-form game.
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Each pure strategy can be interpreted as a full-game plan that specifies deter-
ministic actions for all situations that a player might encounter. Before playing an
iteration of the game each player chooses one of their available plans and commits
to it for the iteration. A mixed strategy Πi for player i is a probability distribution
over their pure strategies. Let ∆i denote the set of all mixed strategies available
to player i. A mixed strategy profile Π ∈ ×i∈N ∆i specifies a mixed strategy for
each player. Finally, Ri(Π) determines the expected return of player i for the mixed
strategy profile Π.
Throughout this dissertation, we use small Greek letters for extensive-form,
behavioural strategies and large Greek letters for pure and mixed strategies of a
game’s normal form.
2.2.4 Sequence Form
The sequence form (Koller et al., 1994; Von Stengel, 1996) is a compact representa-
tion of an extensive-form game, which is well-suited for computing Nash equilibria
of two-player zero-sum games by linear programming (Koller et al., 1996). It de-
composes players’ strategies into sequences of actions and probabilities of realizing
these sequences.
For any player i ∈N of a perfect-recall extensive-form game, each of their
information states ui ∈ U i uniquely defines a sequence σui of actions that the
player has to take in order to reach information state ui. Let σua denote the se-
quence that extends σu with action a. A realization plan, x, maps each player
i’s sequences, {σui}ui∈U i , to realization probabilities, such that x( /0) = 1 and
x(σui) = ∑a∈A (ui) x(σuia)∀si ∈U i. A behavioural strategy pi induces a realization
plan
xpi(σu) = ∏
(u′,a)∈σu
pi(a |u′),
where the notation (u′,a) disambiguates actions taken at different information
states. Similarly, a realization plan induces a behavioural strategy,
pi(a |u) = x(σua)
x(σu)
, x(σu) 6= 0,
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where pi is defined arbitrarily at information states that are never visited, i.e. when
x(σu) = 0. As a pure strategy is just a deterministic behavioural strategy, it has a
realization plan with binary values. As a mixed strategy is a convex combination
of pure strategies, Π = ∑i wiΠi, its realization plan is a similarly weighted convex
combination of the pure strategies’ realization plans, xΠ = ∑i wixΠi .
Two strategies pi1 and pi2 of a player are realization equivalent (Von Stengel,
1996) if and only if for any fixed strategy profile of the other players both strategies,
pi1 and pi2, produce the same probability distribution over the states of the game. As
a realization plan defines probabilities of strategies realizing states, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.2.2 (Von Stengel, 1996). Two strategies are realization equivalent if
and only if they have the same realization plan.
Kuhn’s Theorem (Kuhn, 1953) links extensive-form, behavioural strategies
with (realization-equivalent) normal-form, mixed strategies.
Theorem 2.2.3 (Kuhn, 1953). For a player with perfect recall, any mixed strategy
is realization equivalent to a behavioural strategy, and vice versa.
2.2.5 Fictitious Play
Fictitious play (Brown, 1951) is a classic game-theoretic model of learning from
self-play. Fictitious players repeatedly play a game, at each iteration choosing a best
response to their opponents’ empirical, average strategies. The average strategies of
fictitious players converge to Nash equilibria in certain classes of games, e.g. two-
player zero-sum and many-player potential games (Robinson, 1951; Monderer and
Shapley, 1996). Fictitious play is a standard tool of game theory and has motivated
substantial discussion and research on how Nash equilibria could be realized in
practice (Brown, 1951; Fudenberg and Levine, 1995; Fudenberg, 1998; Hofbauer
and Sandholm, 2002). Leslie and Collins (2006) introduced generalised weakened
fictitious play. It has similar convergence guarantees as common fictitious play, but
allows for approximate best responses and perturbed average strategies, making it
particularly suitable for machine learning.
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Definition 2.2.4 (compare Definition 3 (Leslie and Collins, 2006)). A generalised
weakened fictitious play is a sequence of mixed strategies, {Πk}, Πk ∈ ×i∈N ∆i,
s.t.
Πik+1 ∈ (1−αk+1)Πik +αk+1(BRiεk(Π−ik )+Mik+1), ∀i ∈N ,
with αk→ 0 and εk→ 0 as k→ ∞, ∑∞k=1αk = ∞, and {Mik} sequences of perturba-
tions that satisfy, for any T > 0,
lim
k→∞
sup
l
{∥∥∥∥∥l−1∑j=kα j+1Mij+1
∥∥∥∥∥s.t. l−1∑j=kα j+1 ≤ T
}
= 0, ∀i ∈N .
An appropriate choice of perturbations is e.g. Mt a martingale that is uniformly
bounded in L2 and αk = 1k (Benaı¨m et al., 2005). Original fictitious play Brown
(1951) is a generalised weakened fictitious play with stepsize αk = 1k , εk = 0 and
Mk = 0 ∀k. Cautious or smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine, 1995) uses
ε-best responses defined by a Boltzmann distribution over the action values.
Leslie and Collins (2006) proposed a self-play reinforcement learning method
for normal-form games that follows a generalised weakened fictitious play. In par-
ticular, they simulated two agents that play according to their average fictitious-play
strategies and evaluate action values from the outcomes of these simulations
Qik
(
ai
)≈ Ri (ai,Π−ik−1)
Each agent updates its average fictitious play policy by moving it towards a best
response in form of a Boltzmann distribution over its Q-value estimates.
Hendon et al. (1996) introduced two definitions of fictitious play in extensive-
form games, based on sequential and local best responses respectively. They
showed that each convergence point of these variants is a sequential equilibrium,
but convergence in imperfect-information games could not be guaranteed.
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2.2.6 Best Response Computation
This section describes the computation of best responses in extensive-form games.
Consider a player i of an extensive-form game and let pi−i be a strategy profile of
fellow agents. This strategy profile defines stationary stochastic transitions at all
states that are not controlled by player i. Thus, the game becomes a single-agent
(information-state) MDP. Computing an optimal policy of such an MDP, e.g. by
dynamic programming, produces a best response, BRi(pi−i), to the fellow agents’
strategy profile, pi−i. Johanson et al. (2011) discuss efficient techniques for com-
puting best responses in extensive-form poker games.
We present dynamic-programming values and recursions for computing best
responses in extensive-form games. At each player’s terminal information state, u¯i,
we compute his value as a weighted sum over his returns in all states that belong
to his information set weighted by the realization probabilities of his fellow agents
and chance. In particular,
v(u¯i) = ∑
s∈I−1(u¯i)
xpi−i(σs)R
i(s), (2.24)
where xpi−i(σs) is the product of fellow agents’ and chance’s realization probabilities
based on their respective imperfect-information views of state s. These computed
values are recursively propagated back. In particular, each information state’s value
and best-response action can be recursively defined,
v(ui) = max
a∈A (ui) ∑u∈U i
δ auiuv(u),
β i(ui) = argmax
a∈A (ui)
∑
u∈U i
δ auiuv(u), (2.25)
where δ auiu ∈ {0,1} indicates whether the player can transition (in one step) to in-
formation state u after taking action a in information state ui. Furthermore, the sum
of each player’s values at the game’s root produces the expected reward his best
response achieves. This can be used for computing the exploitability of a strategy
profile.
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2.3 Poker
Poker has traditionally exemplified the challenges of strategic decision making
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Kuhn, 1950; Nash, 1951). It has also be-
come a focus of research in computational game theory (Billings et al., 2002; Sand-
holm, 2010; Rubin and Watson, 2011; Bowling et al., 2015).
In addition to its large number of game states, it features elements of imper-
fect information and uncertainty. These properties are found in many real-world
problems that require strategic decision making, e.g. security, trading and negotia-
tions. Unlike complex real-world problems, however, poker games have clear rules
and structure. This enables rapid simulation and algorithm development. Thus, it
is an excellent domain for furthering methods of multi-agent artifical intelligence,
reinforcement learning and game theory.
In this section we introduce the rules of the poker games that are used in our ex-
periments. In addition, we give an overview of common properties of poker games
and discuss why these are challenging for self-play reinforcement learning. Finally,
we review algorithmic approaches that have been successfully applied to computer
poker.
2.3.1 Rules
There exist many different poker games (Sklansky, 1999). We restrict our presenta-
tion to (Limit) Texas Hold’em, Leduc Hold’em and Kuhn poker. Texas Hold’em is
the most popular poker game among humans and has also been a main challenge in
algorithmic game-theory (Billings et al., 2002; Sandholm, 2010). Leduc Hold’em
and Kuhn poker are smaller poker variants that are well-suited for experiments.
Limit Texas Hold’em is played with a 52 card deck that contains 13 card ranks
and 4 suits. Each episode (hand) of the game consists of up to four betting rounds.
At the beginning of the first round, called preflop, each player is dealt two private
cards. In the second round, the flop, three public community cards are revealed. A
fourth and fifth community card are revealed in the last two rounds, the turn and
river, respectively. Figure 2.2 shows an exemplary situation of a flop in two-player
Texas Hold’em.
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Figure 2.2: Exemplary Texas Hold’em game situation
Players have the following options when it is their turn. A player can fold and
forfeit any chips that he has bet in the current episode. After folding a player is
not allowed to participate any further until the beginning of the next episode of the
game. A player can call by matching the highest bet that has been placed at the
current betting round. If no bet has been placed at the current round then this action
is called a check. A player can raise by betting the round’s currently highest bet
increased by a fixed amount, i.e. bet size. The bet size is two units preflop and on
the flop and four units on the turn and river, called small and big bet respectively.
A marker, called the button, defines the positions of players. After each episode
of the game it is moved by one position clockwise. At the beginning of the game
the first and second player after the button are required to place forced bets of one
and two units respectively, called the small and big blind. Afterwards, the first
betting round commences with the player following the big blind being the first to
act. On the flop, turn and river the first remaining player after the button is the
first to act. The total number of bets or raises per round is limited (capped). In
particular, players are only allowed to call or fold once the current bet has reached
four times the round’s bet size. The game transitions to the next betting round once
all remaining players have matched the current bet. However, each remaining player
is guaranteed to act at least once at each round.
An episode ends in one of two ways. If there is only one player remaining,
i.e. all other players folded, then he wins the whole pot. If at least two players
reach the end of the river then the game progresses to the showdown stage. At the
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showdown each remaining player forms the best five card combination from his
private cards and the public community cards. There are specific rules and rankings
of card combinations (Sklansky, 1999), e.g. three of a kind beats a pair. The player
with the best card combination wins the pot. There is also the possibility of a split
if several players have the same combination.
No-Limit Texas Hold’em has almost the same rules as the Limit variant. The
main difference is that players do not need to bet in fixed increments but are allowed
to relatively freely choose their bet sizes including betting all their chips, known as
moving all-in.
Leduc Hold’em (Southey et al., 2005) is a small variant of Texas Hold’em.
There are three card ranks, J, Q and K, with two of each in the six card deck. There
are two betting rounds, preflop and the flop. Each player is dealt one private card
preflop. On the flop one community card is revealed. Instead of blinds, each player
is required to post a one unit ante preflop, i.e. forced contribution to the pot. The
bet sizes are two units preflop and four units on the flop with a cap of twice the bet
size at each round.
Kuhn poker (Kuhn, 1950) is a simpler variant than Leduc Hold’em. There are
3 cards, a J, Q, and K, in the deck. Each player is dealt one private card and there
is only one round of betting without any public community cards. Each player is
required to contribute a one unit ante to the pot. The bet size is one unit and betting
is capped at one unit.
2.3.2 Properties
Poker presents a variety of difficulties to learning algorithms.
Imperfect Information In imperfect-information games players only observe their
information state, U it , and generally do not know which exact game state, St , they are
in. They might form beliefs, P
(
St |U it
)
, which are generally affected by fellow play-
ers’ strategies at preceding states, Sk, k < t. This implicit connection to prior states
renders common policy iteration (Section 2.1.3) and Minimax search techniques in-
effective in imperfect-information games (compare Appendix A) (Frank and Basin,
1998). This is problematic as many reinforcement learning algorithms are related
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to (generalised) policy iteration (Sutton and Barto, 1998). It also poses a problem to
local search which has been highly successful in large perfect-information games,
e.g. computer Go (Silver et al., 2016a). Given a subgame with perfect player beliefs
based on a full-game Nash equilibrium, resolving the subgame does not generally
recover a Nash equilibrium (Burch et al., 2014; Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2015;
Lisy´ et al., 2015). Finally, Nash equilibria of imperfect-information games are gen-
erally stochastic. By contrast, many reinforcement learning methods are designed
for MDPs, which always have an optimal deterministic strategy. Furthermore, even
with a stochastic policy, the standard GPI approach to reinforcement learning may
be unsuitable for learning Nash equilibria of imperfect-information games (see Sec-
tion A.1).
Size A two-player zero-sum game can theoretically be solved by linear program-
ming (Koller et al., 1996). In practice, however, linear programming does not scale
to the size of Limit Texas Hold’em with current computational resources. Note that
the size of Limit Texas Hold’em, which has about 1018 game states, might not ap-
pear to be large in comparison to much larger perfect-information games such as
chess or Go. However, these game sizes are not directly comparable because local
search and other solution techniques, e.g. Minimax search, are not readily appli-
cable to imperfect-information games. In particular, Minimax search has to parse
the tree only once to produce a Nash equilibrium, whereas CFR or fictitious play
need to repeatedly perform computations at all states. In practice, large imperfect-
information games are usually abstracted to a tractable size (Johanson et al., 2013).
We discuss common abstraction techniques for poker in the next section.
Multi-Player Almost all poker variants are defined for two and more players. Apart
from the escalating size of multi-player games there are more fundamental problems
in finding optimal strategies. The worst-case guarantees of the Minimax Theorem
2.2.1 do not apply to multi-player games. Therefore, it is unclear whether and
when a Nash equilibrium is actually a desired solution. Furthermore, many game-
theoretic approaches do not have any convergence guarantees for even zero-sum
multi-player games (Risk and Szafron, 2010). However, in practice these methods
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have produced competitive policies (Risk and Szafron, 2010) and in some games
converge close to a Nash equilibrium (Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2009).
Variable Outcomes Poker is a game of high variance. The private holdings and
public community cards are dealt by chance. This might pose a challenge to sample-
based evaluation. In addition, instead of a binary outcome as in many board games,
the outcome of poker is based on the monetary units that have been wagered. A
lot of bets and raises lead to large pots. E.g. in Limit Texas Hold’em (LHE) the
outcomes range between −48 and 48. This can pose a challenge for value function
approximation, e.g. neural networks.
2.3.3 Abstraction
This section describes common abstraction techniques for Limit Texas Hold’em. In
order to reduce the game tree to a tractable size, various hand-crafted abstractions
have been proposed in the literature (Billings et al., 2003; Gilpin and Sandholm,
2006; Johanson et al., 2013). A common approach is to group information states
by the strategic similarity of the corresponding cards and leave the players’ ac-
tion sequences unabstracted. Various metrics have been proposed for defining card
similarity. Hand strength-based metrics use the expected winning percentage of
a combination of private and community cards against a random holding (Billings
et al., 2003; Gilpin and Sandholm, 2006; Zinkevich et al., 2007). Distribution-aware
methods compare probability distributions of winning against a random holding
instead of just the expected value (Johanson et al., 2013). A clustering by these
metrics produces an abstraction function, fA, that assigns each card combination
to a cluster. Together with the action sequences, the clusters define the abstracted
information states.
After learning an approximate Nash equilibrium pi in the abstracted game, we
can recover a strategy for the real game by composition pi ◦ fA, i.e. mapping the
real information states to the abstraction and then selecting an action from the strat-
egy. The hope is that pi ◦ fA also approximates a Nash equilibrium in the full game
and that the quality of the approximation improves with the quality of the abstrac-
tion. However, it has been shown that finer abstractions do not always yield better
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approximations in the real game and can result in unintuitive pathologies (Waugh
et al., 2009a).
2.3.4 Current Methods
Efficiently computing Nash equilibria of imperfect-information games has received
substantial attention by researchers in computational game theory (Sandholm, 2010;
Bowling et al., 2015). Game-theoretic approaches have played a dominant role in
furthering algorithmic performance in computer poker. The most popular modern
techniques are either optimisation-based (Koller et al., 1996; Gilpin et al., 2007;
Hoda et al., 2010; Bosansky et al., 2014) or perform (counterfactual) regret minimi-
sation (Zinkevich et al., 2007; Sandholm, 2010).
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2007) is a full-
width self-play approach guaranteed to converge in sequential adversarial (two-
player zero-sum) games. MCCFR (Lanctot et al., 2009) extends CFR to learning
from sampled subsets of game situations. OS (Lanctot et al., 2009; Lisy´ et al., 2015)
is an MCCFR variant that samples single game trajectories. It can be regarded as an
experiential, reinforcement learning method2. However, OS, MCCFR and CFR are
all table-lookup approaches that lack the ability to learn abstract patterns and use
them to generalise to novel situations, which is essential in large-scale games. An
extension of CFR to function approximation (Waugh et al., 2015) is able to learn
such patterns but has not been combined with sampling. Therefore, it still needs
to enumerate all game situations. CFR-based methods have essentially solved two-
player Limit Texas Hold’em poker (Bowling et al., 2015) and produced a champion
program for the No-Limit variant (Brown et al., 2015).
2 We can reinterpret the counterfactual regret as a novel kind of (advantage) value function.
Chapter 3
Smooth UCT Search
In this chapter we address the subquestion,
Can UCT be utilised for learning approximate Nash equilibria in
imperfect-information games?
This is motivated by UCT’s success in perfect-information games. Furthermore, as
extensive-form games are essentially trees, an MCTS algorithm is a suitable choice
for a case study of reinforcement learning in imperfect-information extensive-form
games.
3.1 Introduction
MCTS (see Section 2.1.6) has been incredibly successful in perfect-information
games (Browne et al., 2012; Gelly et al., 2012; Silver et al., 2016a). Although these
methods have been extended to imperfect-information domains (Silver and Veness,
2010; Auger, 2011; Cowling et al., 2012), so far they have not achieved the same
level of practical performance (Brown et al., 2015) or theoretical convergence guar-
antees as competing methods (Lanctot et al., 2009; Lisy´ et al., 2015). In particular,
the prominent UCT algorithm has failed to converge in practice (Ponsen et al., 2011;
Lisy´, 2014).
In this chapter, we investigate UCT-based MCTS in poker as a case study of
reinforcement learning from self-play in imperfect-information games. We focus
on convergence in the full-game MCTS setting, which is a prerequisite for online
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MCTS. In particular, we introduce Smooth UCT, which combines the notion of ficti-
tious play with MCTS. Fictitious players perform the best response to other players’
average behaviour. We introduce this idea into MCTS by letting agents mix in their
average strategy with their usual utility-maximising actions. Intuitively, apart from
mimicking fictitious play, this might have further potential benefits, e.g. breaking
correlations and stabilising self-play learning due to more smoothly changing agent
behaviour.
3.2 MCTS in Extensive-Form Games
In perfect-information games as well as single-agent POMDPs, it is sufficient to
search a single tree that includes the information states and actions of all players.
The asymmetry of players’ information in an extensive-form game with imperfect
information does not allow for a single, collective search tree. In order to extend the
single-agent Partially Observable Monte-Carlo Planning (POMCP) method (Silver
and Veness, 2010) to extensive-form games, we build on the idea of using separate
search trees that are spanned over the respective players’ information states of the
extensive-form game (Auger, 2011; Cowling et al., 2012).
In particular, for each player i we grow a tree T i over their information states
S i. T i(si) is the node in player i’s tree that represents their information state si. In
a game with perfect recall, player i’s sequence of previous information states and
actions, si1,a
i
1,s
i
2,a
i
2, ...,s
i
k, is incorporated in the information state s
i
k and therefore
T i is a proper tree. Imperfect-recall abstractions (Waugh et al., 2009b) can produce
recombining trees. Figure 3.1 illustrates the multiple-tree approach.
Algorithm 1 describes a general MCTS approach for the multi-player
imperfect-information setting of extensive-form games. The game mechanics are
sampled from transition and return simulators G and R. The transition simulator
takes a game state and action as inputs and stochastically generates a successor state
St+1 ∼ G (St ,Ait), where the action Ait belongs to the player i who makes decisions
at state St . The return simulator generates all players’ returns at terminal states, i.e.
R ∼R(ST ). The extensive-form information function, Ii(s), determines the acting
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player i’s information state. The OUT-OF-TREE property keeps track of which
player has left the scope of their search tree in the current episode.
This algorithm can be specified by the action selection and node updating func-
tions, SELECT and UPDATE. These functions are responsible to sample from and
update the tree policy. In this work, we focus on UCT-based methods.
3.3 Extensive-Form UCT
Extensive-Form UCT uses UCB to select from and update the tree policy in Algo-
rithm 1. Algorithm 2 presents this instantiation. It can be seen as a multi-agent
version of Partially Observable UCT (PO-UCT) (Silver and Veness, 2010). PO-
UCT searches a tree over the histories of an agent’s observations and actions in a
POMDP, whereas extensive-form UCT searches multiple agents’ respective trees
over their information states and actions. In a perfect-recall game an information
state implies knowledge of the preceding sequence of information states and actions
and is therefore technically equivalent to a full history (compare Equation 2.1).
3.4 Smooth UCT
Smooth UCT is a MCTS algorithm that selects actions from Smooth UCB, a variant
of the multi-armed bandit algorithm UCB.
Smooth UCB is a heuristic modification of UCB, that is inspired by fictitious
play. Fictitious players learn to best respond to their fellow players’ average strategy
profile. By counting how often each action has been taken, UCB already keeps track
Figure 3.1: The full game tree and the players’ individual information-state trees of a sim-
ple extensive-form game.
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Algorithm 1 Extensive-Form MCTS
function SEARCH
while within computational budget do
Sample initial game state s0
SIMULATE(s0)
end while
return pitree
end function
function ROLLOUT(s)
a∼ pirollout(s)
s′ ∼ G (s,a)
return SIMULATE(s′)
end function
function SIMULATE(s)
if ISTERMINAL(s) then
return r ∼R(s)
end if
i = PLAYER(s)
if OUT-OF-TREE(i) then
return ROLLOUT(s)
end if
ui = Ii(s)
if ui /∈ T i then
EXPANDTREE(T i,ui)
a∼ pirollout(s)
OUT-OF-TREE(i)← true
else
a = SELECT(ui)
end if
s′ ∼ G (s,a)
r← SIMULATE(s′)
UPDATE(ui,a,ri)
return r
end function
of an average strategy pi . It can be readily extracted by setting pit(a) = Nt(a)Nt , where
Nt(a) is the number of times action a has been chosen and Nt = t the total number
of plays. However, UCB does not use this strategy and therefore potentially ignores
some useful information in its search.
The basic idea of Smooth UCB is to mix in the average strategy when selecting
actions in order to induce the other agents to respond to it. This resembles the
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Algorithm 2 UCT
SEARCH(Γ), SIMULATE(s) and ROLLOUT(s) as in Algorithm 1
function SELECT(ui)
return argmaxa Q(ui,a)+ c
√
logN(ui)
N(ui,a)
end function
function UPDATE(ui,a,ri)
N(ui)← N(ui)+1
N(ui,a)← N(ui,a)+1
Q(ui,a)← Q(ui,a)+ ri−Q(ui,a)N(ui,a)
end function
idea of fictitious play, where agents are supposed to best respond to the average
strategy. The average strategy might have further beneficial properties. Firstly,
it is a stochastic strategy and it changes ever more slowly over time. This can
decrease correlation between the players’ actions and thus help to stabilise the self-
play process. Furthermore, a more smoothly changing strategy can be relied upon
by other agents and is easier to adapt to than an erratically changing greedy policy
like UCB.
Smooth UCB requires the same information as UCB but explicitly makes use
of the average strategy via the action counts. In particular, it mixes between UCB
and the average strategy with probability ηk, where ηk is a sequence that decays to
0 or a small constant for k→ ∞. On the one hand, decaying ηk allows the agents
to focus their experience on play against their opponents’ average strategies, which
fictitious players would want to best respond to. On the other hand, decaying ηk
would also slow down exploration and updates to the average strategy. Intuitively,
the annealing schedule for ηk has to balance these effects. In this work, we empiri-
cally chose
ηk = max
(
γ,η0
(
1+d
√
Nk
)−1)
, k > 0, (3.1)
where Nk is the total number of plays, γ a lower limit on ηk, η0 an initial value and
d a constant that parameterises the rate of decay. Intuitively, the decay by
√
Nk and
the lower bound of γ were chosen to avoid a premature slowdown of exploration and
updates to the average strategies. Note that the effective step size of these updates
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is ηkk , due to averaging.
As UCT is obtained from applying UCB at each information state, we similarly
define Smooth UCT as an MCTS algorithm that uses Smooth UCB at each infor-
mation state. Algorithm 3 instantiates extensive-form MCTS with a Smooth UCB
tree policy. For a constant η = 1 (via η0 = 1,d = 0), we obtain UCT as a special
case. Compared to UCT, the UPDATE operation is left unchanged. Furthermore,
for a cheaply determined η the SELECT procedure has little overhead compared
to UCT.
Algorithm 3 Smooth UCT
SEARCH(Γ), SIMULATE(s) and ROLLOUT(s) as in Algorithm 1
UPDATE(ui,a,ri) as in Algorithm 2
function SELECT(ui)
η ←max
(
γ,η0
(
1+d
√
N(ui)
)−1)
as in Equation 3.1
z∼U [0,1]
if z < η then
return argmaxa Q(ui,a)+ c
√
logN(ui)
N(ui,a)
else
∀a ∈ A(ui) : p(a)← N(ui,a)N(ui)
return a∼ p
end if
end function
3.5 Experiments
We evaluated Smooth UCT in the Kuhn, Leduc and Limit Texas Hold’em poker
games.
3.5.1 Kuhn Poker
Ponsen et al. (2011) tested UCT against Outcome Sampling in Kuhn poker. We
conducted a similar experiment, comparing UCT to Smooth UCT. Learning perfor-
mance was measured in terms of the average policies’ mean squared errors with
respect to the closest Nash equilibrium determined from the known parameteri-
zation of equilibria in Kuhn poker (Hoehn et al., 2005). Smooth UCT’s mixing
parameter schedule (3.1) was manually tuned in preliminary experiments on Kuhn
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poker. In particular, we varied one parameter at a time and measured the resulting
achieved exploitability. The best results were achieved with γ = 0.1, η = 0.9 and
d = 0.001. We calibrated the exploration parameters of UCT and Smooth UCT by
training 4 times for 10 million episodes each with parameter settings of c = 0.25k,
k = 1, ...,10. The best average final performance of UCT and Smooth UCT was
achieved with 2 and 1.75 respectively. In each main experiment, each algorithm
trained for 20 million episodes. The results, shown in figure 3.2, were averaged
over 50 repeated runs of the experiment. We see that Smooth UCT approached a
Nash equilibrium, whereas UCT exhibited divergent performance.
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Figure 3.2: Learning curves in Kuhn poker.
3.5.2 Leduc Hold’em
We also compared Smooth UCT to OS (see Section 2.3.4) and UCT in Leduc
Hold’em. Due to not knowing the Nash equilibria in closed form, we measured
learning performance in terms of exploitability of the average strategy profile (see
Equation 2.2.2). Smooth UCT’s mixing parameter schedule (3.1) was manually
tuned in preliminary experiments on Leduc Hold’em. In particular, we varied one
parameter at a time and measured the resulting achieved exploitability. The best
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Figure 3.3: Learning curves in Leduc Hold’em.
results were achieved with γ = 0.1, η = 0.9 and d = 0.002. Smooth UCT and UCT
trained 5 times for 500 million episodes each with exploration parameter settings
of c = 14+ 2k, k = 0, ...,4. We report the best average performance which was
achieved with c = 20 and c = 18 for UCT and Smooth UCT respectively. We com-
pared to both Parallel and Alternating Outcome Sampling (Lanctot, 2013). Both
variants trained for 500 million episodes with exploration parameter settings of
ε = 0.4+ 0.1k, k = 0, ...,4. We report the best results which were achieved with
ε = 0.5 for both variants.
Figure 3.3 shows that UCT diverged rather quickly and never reached a level of
low exploitability. Smooth UCT, on the other hand, learned just as fast as UCT but
continued to approach a Nash equilibrium. For the first million episodes, Smooth
UCT’s performance is comparable to Outcome Sampling. Afterwards, the slope
of its performance curve begins to slowly increase. Alternating Outcome Sam-
pling achieved an exploitability of 0.0065, whereas Smooth UCT was exploitable
by 0.0223 after 500 million episodes.
We investigated Smooth UCT’s long-term performance, by running it for 10
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Figure 3.4: Long-term learning curves in Leduc Hold’em.
billion episodes with the same parameters as in the previous experiment. Figure
3.4 shows that Smooth UCT indeed struggles with convergence to a perfect Nash
equilibrium. Setting γ to zero in the mixing parameter schedule (3.1) appears to
stabilise its performance at an exploitability of around 0.017.
3.5.3 Limit Texas Hold’em
Finally, we consider LHE with two and three players. The two-player game tree
contains about 1018 nodes. In order to reduce the game tree to a tractable size,
various abstraction techniques have been proposed in the literature (Billings et al.,
2003; Johanson et al., 2013). The most common approach is to group information
states according to strategic similarity of the corresponding cards and leave the play-
ers’ action sequences unabstracted. The resulting information state buckets define a
state-aggregating function approximator (compare Section 2.1.4), i.e. abstraction.
In this section, we apply MCTS to an abstraction. This abstraction is hand-
crafted with a common bucketing metric called expected hand strength squared
(Zinkevich et al., 2007). At a final betting round, there are five public community
cards that players can combine their private cards with. The hand strength of such
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Game Preflop Flop Turn River
two-player LHE 169 1000 500 200
three-player LHE 169 1000 100 20
Table 3.1: E[HS2] discretization grids used in experiments.
a combination is defined as its winning percentage against all combinations that
are possible with the respective community cards. On any betting round, E[HS2]
denotes the expected value of the squared hand strength on the final betting round.
We have discretized the resulting E[HS2] values with an equidistant grid over their
range, [0,1]. Table 3.1 shows the grid sizes that we used in our experiments. We
used an imperfect-recall abstraction (Waugh et al., 2009b) that does not let players
remember their E[HS2] values of previous betting rounds. An imperfect-recall ab-
straction is simpler to generate and implement. Furthermore, it allows for a finer
discretization of hand strength values, as the information state assignment (bucket-
ing) at later rounds does not need to condition on the assignment at previous rounds.
In LHE, there is an upper bound on the possible terminal pot size given the
betting that has occurred so far in the episode. This is because betting is capped
at each betting round. To avoid potentially excessive exploration we dynamically
update the exploration parameter during a simulated episode at the beginning of
each betting round and set it to
c = min(C, potsize+ k ∗ remaining betting potential) , (3.2)
where C and k ∈ [0,1] are constant parameters and the remaining betting potential is
the maximum possible amount that players can add to the pot in the remainder of the
episode. Note that the remaining betting potential is 48,40,32,16 at the beginning
of the 4 betting rounds respectively. In particular, for k = 1 at each information
state the exploration parameter is bounded from above by the maximum achievable
potsize in the respective subtree. Furthermore, in two-player LHE, for k = 0.5 it is
approximately bounded by the maximum achievable total return. This is because
each player contributes about half of the potsize.
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Annual Computer Poker Competition We submitted SmooCT, a program trained
with an early version of the Smooth UCT algorithm (Heinrich and Silver, 2014), to
the 2014 ACPC, where it ranked second in all two- and three-player LHE competi-
tions. Our experiments in this dissertation improve on the performance of SmooCT,
the competition program. In particular, SmooCT’s implementation contained the
following differences. First, it used a different mixing parameter schedule (com-
pare (Heinrich and Silver, 2014)). Second, it had a bug in its preflop abstraction
that prevented the agents from distinguishing between suited1 and unsuited cards
preflop. Third, it used a coarser abstraction bucket granularity (compare Table 3.1).
Fourth, for its 3-player instance we manually refined its abstraction granularity for
often-visited subtrees.
Two-player We trained strategies for two-player LHE by UCT and Smooth UCT.
Both methods performed a simulation-based search in the full game. For evaluation,
we extracted a greedy policy profile that at each information state takes the action
with the highest estimated value. Learning performance was measured in milli-big-
blinds won per hand, mbb/h, in actual play against benchmark opponents. To reduce
variance of the evaluation, we averaged the results obtained from symmetric play
that permuted the positions of players, reusing the same random card seeds. We had
access to a benchmark server of the ACPC which enabled us to evaluate against the
contestants of the 2014 competition.
Based on the experiments in Kuhn and Leduc poker, we selected a parameter-
ization for Smooth UCT’s mixing parameter schedule (3.1) and set it to γ = 0.1,
η = 0.9 and d = 20000−1. In the exploration schedule (3.2) we set k = 0.5 and
C= 24, which corresponds to half of the maximum potsize achievable in two-player
LHE. This results in exploration parameter values of c ∈ [10,24], which is centred
around 17, a value that has been reported in a previous calibration of UCT in LHE
by Ponsen et al. (2011).
UCT and Smooth UCT planned for 14 days each, generating about 62.1 and
61.7 billion simulated episodes respectively; note that Smooth UCT had almost
1Cards of the same suit.
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Figure 3.5: Learning performance in two-player Limit Texas Hold’em, evaluated against
SmooCT, the runner-up in the ACPC 2014. The estimated standard error at
each point of the curves is less than 1 mbb/h.
no computational overhead compared to UCT. We trained on a modern desktop
machine, using a single thread and less than 200 MB of RAM. Each greedy strategy
profiles’ uncompressed size was 8.1 MB.
During training, snapshots of the strategies were taken at regular time intervals
in order to measure learning performance over time. In particular, we evaluated
each snapshot by symmetric play for 2.5 million games against SmooCT, the silver-
medal contestant of the 2014 ACPC. In addition, we compared UCT’s and Smooth
UCT’s snapshots by symmetric play against each other. The results in figure 3.5
show that UCT performed slightly better for a training time of under 72 hours.
After 72 hours Smooth UCT outperformed UCT and was able to widen the gap
over time.
Table 3.2 presents an extensive evaluation of greedy policies that were obtained
from UCT and Smooth UCT. The table includes results against all but one contes-
tants of the 2014 ACPC, in the order of their ranking in the competition. We had to
omit the one contestant because it was broken on the benchmark server. The table
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also includes matches between Smooth UCT and UCT. Smooth UCT performed
better than UCT against all but one of the top-7 benchmark agents. Performance
against the weaker 6 ACPC contestants was more even, with Smooth UCT perform-
ing better in just half of the match-ups. Finally, Smooth UCT won in the match-up
against UCT and achieved a higher average performance.
Smooth UCT lost against all but 2 of the top-7 contestants of the 2014 ACPC.
This might be partly due to the much bigger and sophisticated abstractions and
resources used by most of these agents. However, Smooth UCT achieved strong av-
erage performance against the whole field of agents. Similar results were achieved
by SmooCT in the 2014 two-player LHE competition (ACPC). This suggests that
Smooth UCT, using tiny resources and a small abstraction, can train highly compet-
itive policies that perform well in an ecosystem of variable player types. Regarding
the losses against the top agents, it remains unclear whether Smooth UCT would
be able to efficiently compute good approximate Nash equilibria if it were provided
with a larger abstraction.
Match-up Smooth UCT UCT
escabeche -23.49 ± 3.2 -30.26 ± 3.2
SmooCT 10.78 ± 0.8 3.64 ± 0.9
Hyperborean -24.81 ± 4.2 -25.03 ± 4.3
Feste 28.45 ± 4.0 20.02 ± 4.1
Cleverpiggy -25.22 ± 4.0 -30.29 ± 4.0
ProPokerTools -18.30 ± 4.0 -19.84 ± 3.9
652 -20.76 ± 4.0 -19.49 ± 4.0
Slugathorus 93.08 ± 5.7 93.13 ± 5.8
Lucifer 139.23 ± 4.7 138.62 ± 4.7
PokerStar 167.65 ± 4.9 173.19 ± 5.0
HITSZ CS 14 284.72 ± 4.5 281.55 ± 4.5
chump9 431.11 ± 7.7 435.26 ± 7.8
chump4 849.30 ± 8.5 789.28 ± 8.7
Smooth UCT 0 -5.28 ± 0.6
UCT 5.28 ± 0.6 0
average 51.38 48.33
average* 135.50 128.89
Table 3.2: Two-player Limit Texas Hold’em winnings in mbb/h and their standard er-
rors. The average results are reported with and without including chump4 and
chump9.
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Three-player Next we performed a similar evaluation in three-player LHE. Smooth
UCT used the same mixing parameter schedule as in two-player LHE. The explo-
ration schedule (3.2) was set to k= 0.5 and C = 36, which corresponds to half of the
maximum potsize achievable in three-player LHE. UCT and Smooth UCT planned
for 10 days each, generating about 50.9 and 49.4 billion simulated episodes respec-
tively. Once again we trained on a modern desktop machine, using a single thread
and less than 3.6 GB of RAM. Each final greedy strategy profiles’ uncompressed
size was about 435 MB.
The 2014 ACPC featured two three-player LHE competitions that were won
by Hyperborean tbr and Hyperborean iro. In both competitions SmooCT and
KEmpfer finished second and third out of 5 respectively.
Table 3.3 presents our three-player results. Smooth UCT outperformed UCT
in all but 3 match-ups and achieved a higher average performance overall.
Match-up Smooth UCT UCT
Hyperborean iro, KEmpfer 27.06 ± 8 11.35 ± 8
Hyperborean tbr, KEmpfer 8.84 ± 9 2.79 ± 9
Hyperborean tbr, SmooCT -17.10 ± 8 -31.46 ± 9
Hyperborean tbr,
HITSZ CS 14 69.91 ± 10 74.73 ± 10
SmooCT, KEmpfer 42.30 ± 8 50.35 ± 8
SmooCT, HITSZ CS 14 133.49 ± 9 125.79 ± 9
KEmpfer, HITSZ CS 14 171.96 ± 9 194.55 ± 9
2x SmooCT 6.17 ± 1 -5.77 ± 1
2x Smooth UCT 0 -8.16 ± 1
2x UCT 7.51 ± 1 0
average 50.02 46.02
Table 3.3: Three-player Limit Texas Hold’em winnings in mbb/h and their standard errors.
3.6 Conclusion
We have introduced Smooth UCT, a MCTS algorithm for extensive-form games
with imperfect information. In two small poker games, it was able to learn as fast as
UCT but approached an (approximate) Nash equilibrium whereas UCT diverged.
Furthermore, in two- and three-player LHE, a game of real-world scale, Smooth
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UCT outperformed UCT and achieved three silver medals in the 2014 ACPC. The
results suggest that highly competitive strategies can be learned by a full-game
simulation-based search with Smooth UCT.
Introducing the average strategy into the self-play learning process signifi-
cantly improved the performance of UCT. However, in our experiments in Leduc
Hold’em Smooth UCT performed worse than OS and plateaued at an approximate
Nash equilibrium. Hence, Smooth UCT’s heuristic implementation of fictitious play
is promising but imperfect. In the next chapter we introduce an extension of ficti-
tious play to extensive-form games and thus develop a more principled foundation
for self-play reinforcement learning.
Chapter 4
Fictitious Play in Extensive-Form
Games
In this chapter we address the subquestion,
Can fictitious play be extended to extensive-form games?
The motivation is to create a self-play algorithm that offers convergence guarantees
in extensive-form games. In particular, fictitious play exhibits key similarities to
reinforcement learning. Thus, an extensive-form variant could serve as a principled
foundation for the design of self-play reinforcement learning methods.
4.1 Introduction
Fictitious play is a classic example of self-play learning that has inspired artificial
intelligence algorithms in games. Despite the popularity of fictitious play to date, it
has seen use in few large-scale applications, e.g. (Lambert III et al., 2005; McMahan
and Gordon, 2007; Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2009). One possible reason for this
is its reliance on a normal-form representation. While any extensive-form game
can be converted into a normal-form equivalent (Kuhn, 1953), the resulting number
of actions is typically exponential in the number of game states. The extensive
form offers a much more efficient representation via behavioural strategies, whose
number of parameters is linear in the number of information states.
In this chapter, we extend fictitious play to extensive-form games. We begin
with a discussion of various strategy updates. Using one of these updates, we intro-
4.2. Best Response Computation 62
duce Extensive-Form Fictitious Play (XFP). It is realization equivalent to normal-
form fictitious play and therefore inherits its convergence guarantees. However, it
can be implemented using only behavioural strategies and therefore its computa-
tional complexity per iteration is linear in the number of game states rather than
exponential. We empirically compare our methods to CFR (Zinkevich et al., 2007)
and a prior extensive-form fictitious play algorithm (Hendon et al., 1996). Further-
more, we empirically evaluate XFP’s robustness to approximation errors, which is
useful for machine learning applications.
4.2 Best Response Computation
At each iteration, fictitious players compute best responses to their fellow players’
average strategy profile. In extensive-form games, these best responses can be effi-
ciently computed by dynamic programming, as described in Section 2.2.6.
4.3 Strategy Updates
This section explores various options for aggregating extensive-form, behavioural
strategies.
4.3.1 Mixed Strategies
We begin by analysing the mixed strategy updates that a common, normal-form
fictitious player would perform. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over
normal-form actions. Therefore, a weighted aggregate of two mixed strategies can
be computed by taking a convex combination of the two corresponding vectors of
probabilities.
Figure 4.1 depicts such an aggregate of two mixed strategies and its equivalent
representation in extensive form. The aggregate behaviour at player 1’s initial state
is unsurprisingly composed of the two strategies’ behaviour at that state in propor-
tion to their combination’s weights, α and 1−α . Interestingly, the aggregate be-
haviour at player 1’s second state is entirely determined by his second strategy, Π2.
This is because a normal-form aggregate selects (pure) strategies for entire playouts
of the game and does not resample at each information state that is encountered dur-
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of mixed strategy updates in extensive form
ing such playouts. Because strategyΠ1 never reaches the second state, its behaviour
at that state has no impact on the normal-form aggregate behaviour.
4.3.2 Unweighted Behavioural Strategies
A simple option for aggregating behavioural strategies is to linearly combine them
with equal weights at each state. In this section we discuss certain drawbacks of
such updates.
Firstly, this form of aggregaton would clearly yield a different result than the
normal-form aggregation shown in Figure 4.1. Hence, replacing normal-form ficti-
tious play updates with unweighted behavioural updates in the extensive form would
yield a different variant of fictitious play (Hendon et al., 1996), calling into question
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Figure 4.2: Game used in proof of proposition 4.3.1
its convergence guarantees.
Secondly, consider two strategies that achieve a similar return performance
against an opponent strategy profile. For a combination of two such strategies, we
might consider it desirable that the aggregate strategy achieve a performance similar
to its constituent strategies. However, if we combine strategies unweightedly then
their aggregate performance can be arbitrarily worse, as shown by the following
result.
Proposition 4.3.1. There exists a (parameterised) game, two strategies, pi1 and pi2,
and an opponent strategy profile, pi−i, such that both pi1 and pi2 have equal return
performance against pi−i but the unweightedly aggregated strategy, (1− λ )pi1 +
λpi2, performs arbitrarily worse.
Proof. Consider the game in Figure 4.2 and strategies pi1 ≡ L,l and pi2 ≡ R,r. Both
achieve a return of 1 against an opponent strategy profile, pi−i ≡ b, that always
takes action b. However, an unweighted aggregate, (1−λ )pi1+λpi2, will achieve a
return of 1+λ (1−λ )(c−1)< 1 for c < 1. As c could be arbitrarily low, the result
follows.
In a reinforcement learning setting, this problematic scenario may occur when
aggregating two agents’ policies that focus on different areas of the state space.
An unweighted aggregate of two such policies could be tainted by suboptimal be-
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haviour in states that one agent but not the other chose to avoid.
4.3.3 Realization-Weighted Behavioural Strategies
This section introduces an approach to combining strategies that overcomes the re-
turn performance corruption that unweighted aggregation may cause. Furthermore,
this method of combining strategies is equivalent to the corresponding normal-form
aggregation of the respective mixed strategies.
The main idea is to analyse the extensive-form behaviour of a convex combi-
nation of normal-form, mixed strategies. It turns out that the aggregate behaviour
can be efficiently expressed in closed form as a combination of the realization-
equivalent behavioural strategies’ behaviours. The following proposition formalizes
our analysis.
Proposition 4.3.2. Let pi1, ...,pin be behavioural strategies of an extensive-form
game. Let Π1, ...,Πn be mixed strategies that are realization-equivalent to pi1, ...,pin
respectively. Let w1, ...,wn ∈R≥0 be weights that sum to 1. Then the convex combi-
nation of mixed strategies,
Π=
n
∑
k=1
wkΠk,
is realization-equivalent to the behavioural strategy,
pi(u) ∝
n
∑
k=1
wkxpik(σu)pik(u) ∀u ∈U , (4.1)
where ∑nk=1 wkxpik(σu) is the normalizing constant for the strategy at information
state u.
Proof. The realization plan of Π= ∑nk=1 wkΠk is
xΠ(σu) =
n
∑
k=1
wkxΠk(σu), ∀u ∈U .
and due to realization equivalence, xΠk = xpik for k = 1, ...,n. This realization plan
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induces a realization-equivalent behavioural strategy
pi(a |u) = xΠ(σua)
xΠ(σu)
=
∑nk=1 wkxΠk(σua)
∑nk=1 wkxΠk(σu)
=
∑nk=1 wkxpik(σu)pik(a |u)
∑nk=1 wkxpik(σu)
.
Each constituent strategy’s behaviour pik(u) at an information state s is
weighted by its probability of realizing this information state relative to the ag-
gregate strategy’s realization probability,
wkxpik(σu)
xpi(σu)
. (4.2)
This weight is the conditional probability of following strategy pik locally at u given
that the aggregate strategy pi is played globally. Hence, it is 0 for a constituent strat-
egy that never reaches the respective information state and it can be as large as 1 if it
is the only strategy in the combination that reaches the information state. In Section
5.4, we exploit this conditional probability to devise sample-based approximations
of strategy aggregates.
The following corollary analyses the performance of realization-weighted ag-
gregates.
Corollary 4.3.3. Let pi−i be a strategy profile of a player i’s fellow players in an
extensive-form game. Let pi i1, ...,pi
i
n be behavioural strategies of player i, achieving
a return of G1, ...,Gn against pi−i respectively. Let w1, ...,wn ∈ R≥0 be weights that
sum to 1 and
pi i(u) ∝
n
∑
k=1
wkxpi ik(σu)pi
i
k(u) ∀u ∈U i,
a behavioural strategy. Then pi i’s performance against pi−i is a similarly weighted
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convex combination of its constitutent strategies’ returns,
n
∑
k=1
wkGk.
Proof. Given Proposition 4.3.2, pi i is realization equivalent to a mixed strategy
Πi = ∑nk=1 wkΠ
i
k, where each constitutent strategy, Π
i
k is realization equivalent to
pi ik. Following the definition of a mixed strategy, i.e. each constituent strategy Π
i
k
is played with probability wk, the expected return is a similarly weighted convex
combination.
Corollary 4.3.3 shows that for realization-weighted strategy aggregation the
aggregate return is convex in the constituent strategy’s returns. Thus, the return
degradation shown for unweighted aggregates in Proposition 4.3.1 does not occur
with realization-weighted strategy aggregation.
4.4 Extensive-Form Fictitious Play
In this section we combine the extensive-form best response computation and aver-
age strategy updates into a fictitious play that is entirely implemented in behavioural
strategies. Thus, for sequential games computation in the exponentially less effi-
cient normal-form representation can be avoided. Nonetheless, this extensive-form
variant of fictitious play is realization-equivalent to its normal-form counterpart and
thus inherits its convergence guarantees.
The following theorem presents an extensive-form fictitious play that inher-
its the convergence results of generalised weakened fictitious play by realization-
equivalence.
Theorem 4.4.1. Let pi1 be an initial behavioural strategy profile. The extensive-
form process
β it+1 ∈ BRiεt+1(pi−it ),
pi it+1(u) = pi
i
t (u)+
αt+1xβ it+1(σu)
(1−αt+1)xpi it (σu)+αt+1xβ it+1(σu)
(
β it+1(u)−pi it (u)
)
, (4.3)
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for all players i∈N and all their information states u∈U i, with αt→ 0 and εt→
0 as t → ∞, and ∑∞t=1αt = ∞, is realization-equivalent to a generalised weakened
fictitious play in the normal-form and thus the average strategy profile converges to
a Nash equilibrium in all games with the fictitious play property.
Proof. By induction. Assume pit and Πt are realization equivalent and βt+1 ∈
bεt+1(pit) is an εt+1-best response to pit . By Kuhn’s Theorem, let Bt+1 be any mixed
strategy that is realization equivalent to βt+1. Then Bt+1 is an εt+1-best response to
Πt in the normal-form. By Lemma 6, the update in behavioural strategies, pit+1, is
realization equivalent to the following update in mixed strategies
Πt+1 = (1−αt+1)Πt +αt+1Bt+1
and thus follows a generalised weakened fictitious play.
While the generality of this theorem, i.e. variable step size and approximate
best responses, is not really required for a full-width approach, it is useful for guid-
ing the development of sample-based, approximate reinforcement learning tech-
niques.
Algorithm 4 implements XFP, an extensive-form fictitious play according to
Theorem 4.4.1. The initial average strategy profile, pi1, can be defined arbitrarily,
e.g. uniform random. At each iteration the algorithm performs two operations. First
it computes a best response profile to the current average strategies. Secondly it uses
the best response profile to update the average strategy profile. The first iteration’s
computational requirements are linear in the number of game states. For each player
the second operation can be performed independently from their opponents and
requires work linear in the player’s number of information states. Furthermore, if a
deterministic best response is used, the realization weights of Theorem 4.4.1 allow
ignoring all but one subtree at each of the player’s decision nodes.
4.5. Experiments 69
Algorithm 4 Extensive-Form Fictitious Play (XFP)
function FICTITIOUSPLAY(Γ)
Initialize pi1 arbitrarily
j← 1
while within computational budget do
β j+1← COMPUTEBESTRESPONSES(pi j)
pi j+1← UPDATEAVERAGESTRATEGIES(pi j,β j+1)
j← j+1
end while
return pi j
end function
function COMPUTEBESTRESPONSES(pi)
Compute a best-response strategy profile, β ∈ BR(pi), with dynamic pro-
gramming, using Equations 2.24 and 2.25.
return β
end function
function UPDATEAVERAGESTRATEGIES(pi j,β j+1)
for each player i do
Compute an updated strategy pi ij+1 by applying Equation 4.3 to all infor-
mation states of the player.
end for
return pi j+1
end function
4.5 Experiments
4.5.1 Realization-Weighted Updates
In this section, we investigate the effects of unweighted and realization-weighted
strategy updates on the performance of extensive-form fictitious play.
We define updates with effective step sizes, λt+1 :U → [0,1],
pit+1(u) = pit(u)+λt+1(u)(βt+1(u)−pit(u)), ∀u ∈U ,
where βt+1 ∈ b(pit) is a sequential best response and pit is the iteratively updated
average strategy profile. Stepsize λ 1t+1(u) =
1
t+1 produces the sequential extensive-
form fictitious play (Hendon et al., 1996), which applies unweighted strategy up-
dates. XFP is implemented by stepsize λ 2t+1(u) =
xβt+1(σu)
txpit (σu)+xβt+1(σu)
. Note that both
updates use a basic step size of αt = 1t (compare Equation 4.3).
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The initial average strategy profiles were initialized randomly as follows. At
each information state u, we drew the weight for each action from a uniform dis-
tribution and normalized the resulting strategy at u. We trained each algorithm for
400000 iterations and measured the exploitability of the average strategy profile af-
ter each iteration. The experiment was repeated five times and all learning curves
are plotted in figure 4.3. The results show noisy behaviour of each fictitious play
process that used stepsize λ 1. Each instance of XFP reliably approached an approx-
imate Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 4.3: Learning curves of extensive-form fictitious play processes in Leduc Hold’em,
for stepsizes λ 1 and λ 2.
4.5.2 GFP and Comparison to CFR
In Appendix B we introduce Geometric Fictitious Play (GFP), a novel, experimental
variant of extensive-form fictitious play. This section compares the performance of
XFP, GFP and CFR in Leduc Hold’em.
Note that the GFP update (see Equation B.2) weights the vanilla average strat-
egy by (1−α)D+1, where D is the maximum depth of the player’s information-state
tree. For Leduc Hold’em we have D = 3. To control for the different effective step-
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sizes of XFP and GFP, we included variants with scaled and normalized stepsizes.
In particular, we normalized GFP’s stepsize by αk1−(1−αk)D+1 to match vanilla XFP’s.
Vice versa, we scaled XFP’s stepsize by 1−(1−αk)
D+1
αk
to match vanilla GFP’s. For
each variant, we repeated the experiment 3 times with randomly initialized average
strategies (as above). All learning curves are plotted in Figure 4.4. The results show
that GFP outperformed XFP in Leduc Hold’em. This improvement does not appear
to be merely due to the larger effective stepsize, as scaling XFP’s stepsize had a
detrimental effect.
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Figure 4.4: Performance of XFP and GFP variants in Leduc Hold’em.
We also compared the performance of XFP and GFP to CFR, the main game-
theoretic approach to computing Nash equilibria from self-play. We initialized all
variants’ initial strategy to uniform random at all information states. As the algo-
rithms are deterministic, we present a single run of all algorithms in Figure 4.5.
Like CFR, both XFP and GFP appear to converge at a rate of O(k−
1
2 ), where k is
the iteration count, as conjectured by Karlin (1959).
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of XFP, GFP and CFR in Leduc Hold’em.
4.5.3 Robustness of XFP
Our ultimate goal is to develop self-play reinforcement learning algorithms that ap-
proximate XFP and achieve its convergence properties. This is partly motivated
by the fact that generalised weakened fictitious play (Leslie and Collins, 2006) is
robust to various approximations. As machine learning algorithms will incur vari-
ous approximation and sampling errors, we investigate the potential effects of such
errors on XFP’s performance. In particular, we explore what happens when the per-
fect averaging used in XFP is replaced by an incremental averaging process closer
to gradient descent. Furthermore, we explore what happens when the exact best
response used in XFP is replaced by an approximation with epsilon error.
Figure 4.6 shows the performance of XFP with default, 1/T , and constant
stepsizes for its strategy updates. We see improved asymptotic but lower initial
performance for smaller stepsizes. For constant stepsizes the performance seems to
plateau rather than diverge. These results may guide algorithmic design decisions
for machine learning of average strategies, e.g. a decaying learning rate of gradient
descent might be a reasonable choice.
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Figure 4.6: The impact of constant stepsizes on the performance of full-width fictitious
play in Leduc Hold’em.
Reinforcement learning agents typically add random exploration to their poli-
cies and may use noisy stochastic updates to learn action values, which determine
their approximate best responses. Therefore, we investigated the impact of random
noise added to the best response computation, which XFP performs by dynamic pro-
gramming. At each backward induction step, we return a uniform-random action’s
value with probability ε and the best action’s value otherwise. Figure 4.7 shows
monotonically decreasing performance with added noise. However, performance
remains stable and keeps improving for all noise levels.
4.6 Conclusion
We have shown that fictitious play can be entirely implemented in behavioural
strategies of the extensive-form representation. The resulting approach, XFP, is
realization-equivalent to common, normal-form fictitious play and therefore pre-
serves all its convergence guarantees. However, XFP is much more efficient in
extensive-form games as its computational requirements in time and space are lin-
ear in the number of game states, rather than exponential.
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Figure 4.7: The performance of XFP in Leduc Hold’em with uniform-random noise added
to the best response computation.
We complemented our theoretical results with the following empirical findings.
Firstly, our experiments have shown that (realization-weighted) XFP significantly
outperforms a prior extensive-form fictitious play algorithm (Hendon et al., 1996)
that ignored such weightings. Secondly, in Leduc Hold’em we have seen GFP im-
prove on the performance of XFP and both achieved a similar level of performance
as CFR. Furthermore, both XFP and GFP appear to converge at a rate of O(k−
1
2 ),
where k is the iteration count, as conjectured by Karlin (1959). Finally, our ex-
periments have found XFP to be robust to various approximation errors and fixed
step sizes. This finding is aligned with the theoretical guarantees of generalised
weakened fictitious play allowing for certain approximations and perturbations.
This chapter introduced realization-weighted, full-width updates of fictitious
players’ strategies. These updates’ weights are in fact conditional probabilities that
prescribe a way to sample the updated strategies. In the next chapter we develop
sample-based methods that build upon this observation.
Chapter 5
Fictitious Self-Play
In this chapter we address the subquestion,
Can XFP be approximated by agents learning from sampled experi-
ence?
Such agents, in principle, would be able to learn approximate Nash equilibria from
self-play in games where fictitious play is guaranteed to converge.
5.1 Introduction
In XFP players compute their best responses, i.e. goal-directed strategies, by dy-
namic programming on their information state trees. In addition, they compute
routine strategies that average their past best responses. Thus, XFP is reminiscent
of an actor-critic architecture (Barto et al., 1983; Sutton et al., 1999a). In particular,
XFP moves players’ average strategies (actors) towards their best responses (crit-
ics). XFP has further properties that render it suitable for machine learning. First,
best responses are just strategies that are best in hindsight, i.e. optimal policies with
respect to an agent’s experience. This enables the use of standard reinforcement
learning techniques. Second, an average strategies’ weights (compare Equation 4.1)
are in fact conditional probabilites (see Equation 4.2) that are automatically realized
when sampling from the agent’s average policy. This enables the use of standard
supervised learning techniques for mimicking the sampled behaviour (labels).
In this chapter, we develop a sample-based machine learning approach to find-
ing Nash equilibria in imperfect-information games. We introduce Fictitious Self-
5.2. Experiential Learning 76
Play (FSP), a class of learning algorithms that approximate XFP. In FSP players
repeatedly play a game and learn from their experience. In particular, players learn
approximate best responses from their experience of play against their opponents.
In addition, they learn a model of their own average, routine strategy from their
experience of their own behaviour. In more technical terms, FSP iteratively sam-
ples episodes of the game from self-play. These episodes constitute experience that
is used by reinforcement learning to produce approximate best responses and by
supervised learning to produce models of average strategies.
5.2 Experiential Learning
XFP and related game-theoretic approaches face the following two challenges when
applied to large domains.
XFP is a full-width approach that suffers from the curse of dimensionality. At
each iteration, computation needs to be performed at all states of the game irrespec-
tive of their relevance. However, generalised weakened fictitious play (Leslie and
Collins, 2006) only requires approximate best responses and even allows some per-
turbations in the updates. An extensive-form game usually has sequential structure
that could be exploited when computing approximate best responses and strategy
updates, e.g. by sampling likely trajectories of the game.
XFP is not compatible with function approximation. Each state is represented
in isolation; preventing agents from generalising their knowledge between similar
states. Currently, researchers in computational game theory usually circumvent this
problem by hand-crafting abstractions of the game and applying their algorithm to
the smaller, abstracted version of the game. It would be desirable that the algorithm
itself can find such abstractions that best approximate the learned strategies and
action values.
FSP addresses both problems by introducing two innovations. Firstly, it
replaces XFP’s full-width strategy and action-value updates with approximate,
sample-based learning methods. Secondly, FSP agents can represent their strate-
gies and action-value estimates with function approximators instead of using table-
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lookup representations. Approximate best responses are learned by reinforcement
learning from experience of play against the opponents’ average strategies. The
average strategy updates can be formulated as a supervised learning task, where
each player learns a transition model of their own behaviour. We introduce re-
inforcement learning-based best response computation in section 5.3 and present
supervised learning-based strategy updates in section 5.4.
5.3 Best Response Learning
This section develops reinforcement learning of approximate best responses from
sampled experience. We first break up the iterations of fictitious play into a se-
quence of MDPs. Then, we describe how agents can sample experience of these
MDPs. Next, we present a suitable memory architecture for off-policy learning
from such experience. Finally, we discuss the approximation effects of reinforce-
ment learning on the fictitious play process.
5.3.1 Sequence of MDPs
Consider an extensive-form game Γ and some strategy profile pi . Then for each
player i ∈N the strategy profile of their opponents, pi−i, defines an MDP,M (pi−i)
(Greenwald et al., 2013). Player i’s information states define the states of the MDP
(Silver and Veness, 2010). The MDP’s dynamics are given by the rules of the
extensive-form game, the chance function and the opponents’ fixed strategy pro-
file. The rewards are given by the game’s return function.
An ε-optimal policy of the MDP,M (pi−i), yields an ε-best response of player
i to the strategy profile pi−i. Thus fictitious players’ iterative computation of approx-
imate best responses can be formulated as a sequence of MDPs to solve approxi-
mately, e.g. by applying reinforcement learning to samples of experience from the
respective MDPs. In particular, to approximately solve the MDPM (pi−i) we sam-
ple player i’s experience from their opponents’ strategy profile pi−i. Player i’s strat-
egy should ensure sufficient exploration of the MDP but can otherwise be arbitrary
if an off-policy reinforcement learning method is used, e.g. Q-learning (Watkins
and Dayan, 1992).
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5.3.2 Sampling Experience
Each agent i tries to evaluate and maximise its action values, Qi(s,a) ≈
Eβ i,pi−i
[
Git
∣∣St = s,At = a], of playing its (approximate) best response policy β i
against its fellow agents’ average strategy profile, pi−i. The approximate best re-
sponse policy can be defined with respect to the Q-values, e.g. β i = ε-greedy
[
Qi
]
or β i = Boltzmann
[
Qi
]
.
In an on-policy setting we can simply let each agent i play its best response
policy against its opponents’ fixed average strategy profile, pi−i, in alternating self-
play. Through iteration of policy evaluation and policy improvement, each agent
would learn an approximate best response. In an off-policy setting we can let all
agents play their average strategies, pi , in simultaneous self-play and have them col-
lect their experience in a memory. This experience can then be evaluated with off-
policy reinforcement learning, again yielding an approximate best response through
iterative policy evaluation and improvement.
In this chapter we use off-policy, batch reinforcement-learning methods to
learn from memorized experience. At each iteration k, FSP samples each agent i’s
experience from two types of strategy profiles, the average strategy profile pik and
the strategy profile (β ik+1,pi
−i
k ). Both profiles generate experience of play against
the current average strategy profile of the agent’s opponents. Each agent i adds this
experience to its replay memory, M iRL. The data is stored in the form of transition
tuples, (ut ,at ,rt+1,ut+1), that are typical for reinforcement learning.
5.3.3 Memorizing Experience
We use a finite memory of fixed size. If the memory is full, new transitions replace
existing transitions in a first-in-first-out order. Thus, each agent i’s memory, M iRL,
contains experience of a sliding window of past MDPs, i.e.
M iRL ≈
1
s+1
t
∑
k=t−s
M (pi−ik ),
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where s depends on the capacity of the memory. As fictitious players’ average
strategies, pik, change more slowly over time,
lim
t→∞
1
s+1
t
∑
k=t−s
Πk =Πt
the memory’s windowing artifacts have a limited effect asymptotically,
1
s+1
t
∑
k=t−s
M (pi−ik )→M (pi−it ) for t→ ∞.
5.3.4 Best Response Quality
While generalised weakened fictitious play allows εk-best responses at iteration k,
it requires that the deficit εk vanishes asymptotically, i.e. εk→ 0 as k→ ∞. Learn-
ing such a valid sequence of εk-optimal policies of a sequence of MDPs would be
hard if these MDPs were unrelated and knowledge could not be transferred. How-
ever, in fictitious play the MDP sequence has a particular structure. The average
strategy profile at iteration k is realization-equivalent to a linear combination of two
mixed strategies, Πk = (1−αk)Πk−1+αkBk. Thus, in a two-player game, the MDP
M (pi−ik ) is structurally equivalent to an MDP that initially picks betweenM (pi
−i
k−1)
and M (β−ik ) with probability (1−αk) and αk respectively. Due to this similar-
ity between subsequent MDPs it is possible to transfer knowledge. The following
proposition bounds the increase of the optimality deficit when transferring an ap-
proximate solution between subsequent MDPs in a fictitious play process.
Proposition 5.3.1. Consider a two-player zero-sum extensive-form game with max-
imum return range Rˆ = maxpi∈∆R1(pi)−minpi∈∆R1(pi). Consider a fictitious play
process in this game. Let Πk be the average strategy profile at iteration k, Bk+1
a profile of εk+1-best responses to Πk, and Πk+1 = (1−αk+1)Πk +αk+1Bk+1 the
usual fictitious play update for some stepsize αk+1 ∈ (0,1). Then for each player i,
Bik+1 is an [εk+1+2αk+1Rˆ]-best response to Πk+1.
Proof. W.l.o.g. we prove the result for a player i at a fixed iteration k ∈ N. Further-
more, set α = αk+1 and ε = εk+1. Define vk = Ri(BRi(Π−ik ),Π
−i
k ), the value of a
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best response to strategy profile Π−ik . Consider,
vk+1 = Ri(BRi(Π−ik+1),Π
−i
k+1)
≤ (1−α)Ri(BRi(Πk),Πk)+αRˆ
= (1−α)vk +αRˆ
Then,
Ri(Bik+1,Πk+1) = (1−α)Ri(Bik+1,Π−ik )+αRi(Bik+1,B−ik+1)
≥ (1−α)(vk− ε)−αRˆ
≥ vk+1− (1−α)ε−2αRˆ
≥ vk+1−
(
ε+2αRˆ
)
This bounds the absolute amount by which reinforcement learning needs to
improve the best response profile to achieve a monotonic decay of the optimality
gap εk. However, εk only needs to decay asymptotically. Given αk→ 0 as k→ ∞,
the bound suggests that in practice a finite amount of learning per iteration might be
sufficient to achieve asymptotic improvement of best responses. In Section 5.6.1,
we empirically analyse whether this is indeed the case in practice. Furthermore,
in our experiments on the robustness of (full-width) XFP (see Section 4.5.3), it
robustly approached lower-quality strategies for noisy, low-quality best responses.
5.4 Average Strategy Learning
This section develops supervised learning of approximate average strategies from
sampled experience. We first translate fictitious players’ averaging of strategies into
an equivalent problem of agents learning to model themselves. Then, we describe
how appropriate experience for such models may be sampled. Next, we present suit-
able memory architectures for off-policy learning from such experience. Finally, we
discuss the approximation effects of machine learning on the fictitious play process.
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5.4.1 Modeling Oneself
Consider the point of view of a particular player i who wants to learn a behavioural
strategy pi that is realization-equivalent to a convex combination of their own
normal-form strategies, Π = ∑kj=1 w jB j, ∑
k
j=1 w j = 1. This task is equivalent to
learning a model of the player’s behaviour when it is sampled from Π. In addition
to describing the behavioural strategy pi explicitly, Proposition 4.3.2 prescribes a
way to sample data sets of such convex combinations of strategies.
Corollary 5.4.1. Let {Bk}1≤k≤n be mixed strategies of player i, Π = ∑nk=1 wkBk,
∑nk=1 wk = 1 a convex combination of these mixed strategies and µ
−i a completely
mixed sampling strategy profile that defines the behaviour of player i’s fellow
agents. Then the expected behaviour of player i, when sampling from the strategy
profile (Π,µ−i), defines a behavioural strategy,
pi(a |u) = P(Ait = a |U it = u,Ait ∼Π) ∀u ∈U i ∀a ∈A (u), (5.1)
that is realization equivalent to Π.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of realization equivalence. In particular, con-
sider player i sampling fromΠ=∑nk=1 wkBk. For k= 1, ...,n, let βk be a behavioural
strategy that is realization equivalent to Bk. Choose u ∈ U i and a ∈ A (u). Then,
when sampling from (Π,µ−i), the probability of player i sampling action a in in-
formation state u is
P(u,a |Π,µ−i) =
n
∑
k=1
wkxβk(σu)βk(a |u) ∑
s∈I−1(u)
xµ−i(σs),
=
(
n
∑
k=1
wkxβk(σu)βk(a |u)
) ∑
s∈I−1(u)
xµ−i(σs)
 ,
where xµ−i(σs) is the product of fellow agents’ and chance’s realization probabili-
ties based on their respective imperfect-information views of state s. Conditioning
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on reaching u yields
P(a |u,Π,µ−i) ∝
n
∑
k=1
wkxβk(σu)βk(a |u),
which is equivalent to the explicit update in Equation 4.1.
Hence, the behavioural strategy pi i can be learned approximately from a data
set consisting of trajectories sampled from (Πi,µ−i). Recall that we can sample
from Π = ∑nk=1 wkBk by sampling whole episodes from each constituent β
i
k ≡ Bik
with probability wk.
5.4.2 Sampling Experience
In fictitious play, our goal is to keep track of the average mixed strategy profile
Πk+1 =
1
k+1
k+1
∑
j=1
B j =
k
k+1
Πk +
1
k+1
Bk+1.
Both Πk and Bk+1 are available at iteration k and we can therefore apply Proposi-
tion 5.4.1 to sample experience of a behavioural strategy pi ik+1 that is realization-
equivalent to Πik+1. In particular, for a player i we would repeatedly sample
episodes of him following his strategy pi ik+1 against a fixed, completely mixed strat-
egy profile of his opponents, µ−i. Note, that player i can follow pi ik+1 by choosing
between pi ik and β
i
k+1 at the root of the game with probabilities
k
k+1 and
1
k respec-
tively and committing to his choice for an entire episode. The player would ex-
perience sequences of state-action pairs, (st ,at), where at is the action he chose
at information state st following his strategy. This experience constitutes data that
approximates the desired strategy that we want to learn, e.g. by fitting the data set
with a function approximator. Alternatively, players can collect state-policy pairs,
(st ,ρt), where ρt = Et
[(
1{At=1}, ...,1{At=n}
)]
is the player’s policy at state St .
Instead of resampling a whole new data set of experience at each iteration,
we can incrementally update our data set from a stream of best responses, β ij, j =
1, ... ,k. In order to constitute an unbiased approximation of an average of best
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responses, 1k ∑
k
j=1 B
i
j, we need to accumulate the same number of sampled episodes
from each Bij and these need to be sampled against the same fixed opponent strategy
profile µ−i. However, we suggest using the average strategy profile pik as the (now
varying) sampling distribution µk. Sampling against pik has the benefit of focusing
the updates on states that are more likely in the current strategy profile. When
collecting samples incrementally, the use of a changing sampling distribution pik
can introduce bias. However, in fictitious play pik is changing more slowly over
time and thus it is conceivable for this bias to decay over time as well.
5.4.3 Memorizing Experience
In principle, collecting sampled data from an infinite stream of best responses would
require an unbounded memory. To address this issue, we propose a table-lookup
counting model and the use of reservoir sampling (Vitter, 1985) for general super-
vised learning.
Table-Lookup A simple, but possibly expensive, approach to memorizing experi-
ence of past strategies, is to count the number of times each action has been taken.
For each sampled tuple, (sit ,a
i
t), we update the count of the chosen action.
N(sit ,a
i
t)← N(sit ,ait)+1
Alternatively, we can accumulate local policies ρ it = β it (sit), where sit is agent i’s
information state and β it is the strategy that the agent pursued at this state when this
experience was sampled.
∀a ∈A (st) : N(st ,a)← N(st ,a)+ρ it (a)
The average strategy can be readily extracted.
∀a ∈A (st) : pi(st ,a)← N(st ,a)N(st)
As each sampled tuple, (sit ,a
i
t) or (s
i
t ,ρ it ), only needs to be counted once, we can
parse the experience of average strategies in an online fashion and thus avoid infinite
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memory requirements.
Reservoir In large domains, it is unfeasible to keep track of action counts at all
information states. We propose to track a random sample of past best response be-
haviour with a finite-capacity memory by applying reservoir sampling to the stream
of state-action pairs sampled from the stream of best responses.
Reservoir sampling (Vitter, 1985) is a class of algorithms for keeping track of
a finite random sample from a possibly large or infinite stream of items, {xk}k≥1.
Assume a reservoir (memory), M , of size n. For the first n iterations, all items,
x1, ...,xn, are added to the reservoir. At iteration k > n, the algorithm randomly
replaces an item in the reservoir with xk with probability nk , and discards xk other-
wise. Thus, at any iteration k, the reservoir contains a uniform random sample of
the items that have been seen so far, x1, ...,xk. Exponential reservoir sampling (Os-
borne et al., 2014) replaces items in the reservoir with a probability that is bounded
from below, i.e. max(p, nk ), where p is a chosen minimum probability. Thus, once
k = np items have been sampled, the items’ likelihood of remaining in the reservoir
decays exponentially.
Adding agents’ experience of their (approximate) best responses to their re-
spective supervised learning memories (reservoirs), MSL, with vanilla reservoir
sampling approximates a 1T step size of fictitious play, where T abstracts the it-
eration counter. Using exponential reservoir sampling results in an approximate
step size of max(α, 1T ), where α depends on the chosen minimum probabiltiy and
capacity of the reservoir.
5.4.4 Average Strategy Approximation
Let Π˜ik be an approximation of the average strategy profile Πk =
1
k ∑
k
j=1 B j, learned
from a perfect fit of samples from the stream of best responses, Bk,k ≥ 1, e.g. with
the counting model. As we collect more samples from this stream, the approxi-
mation error, Π˜ik−Πik, decays with increasing k. However, these approximation
errors can bias the sequence of learned best responses, Bk+1, as they are trained
with respect to the approximate average strategies, Π˜k. While generalised weak-
ened fictitious play only requires asymptotically-perfect best responses, this could
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slow down convergence to an impractical level. In Section 5.6.1, we empirically
analyse the approximation error, Π˜ik−Πik.
5.5 Algorithm
FSP can be implemented in a variety of ways, e.g. on- or off-policy and online or
batch variants are possible. The key idea is that the two fictitious play operations,
namely best response computation and average strategy updates, are implemented
via reinforcement and supervised learning respectively. Which exact machine learn-
ing methods to use, is up to the user and can be tailored to the demands of the
domain. It is critical though that one ensures that agents learn from appropriate ex-
perience, as discussed in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.2. Algorithm 5 presents FSP in this
abstract generality.
Algorithm 5 Abstract Fictitious Self-Play
Initialize completely mixed average strategy profile pi1
for k = 1, ...,K−1 do
for each player i do
Update approximate best response, β ik+1, via reinforcement learning from
experience in the MDP induced by fellow agents’ average strategy profile,
M (pi−ik )
Update average strategy, pi ik+1, via supervised learning from experience
of own historical best response behaviour, ∑k+1j=1 B
i
j or Π
i
k +
1
k+1
(
Bik+1−Πik
)
end for
end for
return piK
In this chapter we restrict ourselves to batch reinforcement learning from mem-
orized experience and a table-lookup, counting model to keep track of players’ av-
erage strategies. We first discuss a general batch algorithm for FSP in Section 5.5.1
and then instantiate it with Q-learning and a table-lookup counting model in Section
5.5.2.
5.5.1 Batch
This section introduces a batch variant of FSP, presented in Algorithm 6. This vari-
ant separates the sampling of agents’ experience to fill their memories from their
learning from these memories. It does not specify particular off-policy reinforce-
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ment learning or supervised learning techniques, as these can be instantiated by a
variety of algorithms.
Algorithm 6 Batch Fictitious Self-Play
Initialize completely mixed average strategy profile pi1
Initialize replay memoriesMRL andMSL
Initialize the constant numbers of episodes that are sampled simultaneously, n,
and alternatingly, m
for k = 1, ...,K−1 do
SAMPLESIMULTANEOUSEXPERIENCE(n,pik,MRL)
Each player i updates their approximate best response strategy
β ik+1← REINFORCEMENTLEARNING(M iRL)
SAMPLEALTERNATINGEXPERIENCE(m,pik,βk+1,MRL,MSL)
Each player i updates their average strategy
pi ik+1← SUPERVISEDLEARNING(M iSL)
end for
return piK
function SAMPLESIMULTANEOUSEXPERIENCE(n, pi ,MRL)
Sample n episodes from strategy profile pi
For each player i store their experienced transitions,
(
uit ,at ,rt+1,u
i
t+1
)
, in
their reinforcement learning memoryM iRL
end function
function SAMPLEALTERNATINGEXPERIENCE(m,pi,β ,MRL,MSL)
for each player i ∈N do
Sample m episodes from strategy profile (β i,pi−i)
Store player i’s experienced transitions,
(
uit ,at ,rt+1,u
i
t+1
)
, in their rein-
forcement learning memoryM iRL
Store player i’s experienced own behaviour,
(
uit ,at
)
or
(
uit ,β i(uit)
)
, in
their supervised learning memoryM iSL
end for
end function
Reinforcement Learning For each agent i, the functions SAMPLESIMULTANEOU-
SEXPERIENCE and SAMPLEALTERNATINGEXPERIENCE both generate experience
of play against fellow agents’ average strategy profile, pi−ik , at iteration k. As this is
the strategy profile the agent wants to learn to best respond to, all this experience is
added to the agent’s reinforcement learning memory, M iRL. Thus, an approximate
best response to pi−ik can be learnt via off-policy reinforcement learning from the
memory. In this work, we implement the memories with circular buffers, which
produce sliding-window approximations as discussed in Section 5.3.3.
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Supervised Learning In order to enable agents to learn their own average strate-
gies, the function SAMPLEALTERNATINGEXPERIENCE also generates experience
of the agents’ own best response behaviour. This experience is added to the agents’
respective supervised learning memories, M iSL, i = 1, ...,N. For each agent a fixed
number (m) of episodes is added from each of their past best responses. Thus,
at iteration k an agent i’s supervised learning memory approximates its historical,
average strategy, ∑k+1j=1 B
i
j.
5.5.2 Table-lookup
Algorithm 7 instantiates Batch FSP with table-lookup methods. In particular, to
learn approximate best responses we use Q-learning with experience replay on
the reinforcement learning memories. Given (approximately) evaluated Q-values,
a Boltzmann distribution over these values yields an approximate best response.
To keep track of the average strategies, we aggregate the experience from the su-
pervised learning memories into a counting model that was introduced in Section
5.4.3.
5.6 Experiments
This section presents experiments with table-lookup FSP. We begin by investigating
the approximation errors induced by our learning- and sample-based approach. We
then compare FSP to (full-width) XFP to illustrate the benefits of sampling and
learning from experience.
5.6.1 Empirical Analysis of Approximation Errors
Section 5.3.4 expressed concerns about the quality of approximate best responses
that are produced by reinforcement learning with a finite computational budget.
Here, we empirically investigate the quality of approximate best responses that
table-lookup FSP produces with Q-learning. In particular, we measure the optimal-
ity gap of the approximate ε-best responses, βk+1, to the average strategy profiles,
pik,
ε =
∑2i=1 Ri
(
BR(pi−ik ),pi
−i
k
)−Ri (β ik+1,pi−ik )
2
. (5.2)
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Algorithm 7 Table-lookup Batch FSP with Q-learning and counting model
Initialize Q-learning parameters, e.g. learning stepsize
Initialize all agents’ table-lookup action-values,
{
Qi
}
i∈N
Intiialize all agents’ table-lookup counting models,
{
Ni
}
i∈N
Initialize and run Algorithm 6 (Batch FSP) with REINFORCEMENTLEARNING
and SUPERVISEDLEARNING methods below
function REINFORCEMENTLEARNING(M iRL)
Restore previous iteration’s Qi-values
Update (decay) learning stepsize and Boltzmann temperature
Learn updated Qi-values with Q-learning fromM iRL
return Boltzmann[Qi]
end function
function SUPERVISEDLEARNING(M iSL)
Restore previous iteration’s counting model, Ni, and average strategy, pi i
for each (ut ,ρt) inM iSL do
∀a ∈A (ut) : Ni(ut ,a)← Ni(ut ,a)+ρt(a)
∀a ∈A (ut) : pi i(ut ,a)← N
i(ut ,a)
Ni(ut)
end for
EmptyM iSL
return pi i
end function
Figure 5.1 shows the quality of the best responses improve over time. As we use
a fixed computational budget per iteration, this demonstrates that knowledge is in-
deed transferred between iterations. It appears that Q-learning can keep up with the
slower changing average strategy profiles it learns against.
Section 5.4.4 expressed concerns about the quality of approximate average
strategies that are produced from a finite amount of samples from each constituent
(past) best response. Here, we empirically investigate the resulting approximation
error. In particular, we additionally track a perfect average strategy, which we com-
pute by periodically averaging the respective best responses according to XFP’s
full-width update (see Theorem 4.4.1). Note that these perfect average strategies do
not affect FSP in any way; they are only computed for evaluation purposes. We then
compute the squared distance (error) between this perfect average and the approxi-
mate average strategy contained in the counting model of table-lookup FSP. Figure
5.2 shows the approximate average strategy profile approach the quality of several
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Figure 5.1: Analysis of the best response approximation quality of table-lookup FSP in
Leduc Hold’em.
perfect average strategies, which were computed at intervals of 10, 100 and 1000
iterations respectively. This suggests that, in principle, we can track and learn the
average strategy of fictitious play from sampled experience.
5.6.2 Sample-Based Versus Full-Width
We tested the performance of FSP Algorithm 7 with a fixed computational budget
per iteration and evaluated how it scales to larger games in comparison to XFP.
We manually tuned the FSP parameters in preliminary experiments on 6-card
Leduc Hold’em. In particular, we varied single or small subsets of parameters at
a time and measured the resulting achieved exploitability. The best results were
achieved with the following calibration, which we used in all subsequent experi-
ments and games presented in this section. In particular, for each player i, we used
a replay memory, M iRL, with space for 40000 episodes. We sampled 2 episodes
simultaenously from strategy profile pi and 1 episode alternatingly from (β i,pi−i) at
each iteration for each player respectively, i.e. we set n = 2 and m = 1 in algorithm
6. At each iteration k each agent replayed 30 episodes with Q-learning stepsize
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Figure 5.2: Analysis of the average strategy approximation quality of table-lookup FSP in
Leduc Hold’em.
0.05
1+0.003
√
k
. It returned an (approximate) best response policy that at each informa-
tion state was determined by a Boltzmann distribution over the estimated Q-values,
using temperature (1+0.02
√
k)−1. The Q-value estimates were maintained across
iterations, i.e. each iteration started with the Q-values of the previous iteration.
We compared XFP and FSP in parameterizations of Leduc Hold’em and River
poker. In each experiment, both algorithms’ initial average strategy profiles were
initialized to a uniform distribution at each information state. Each algorithm
trained for 300 seconds. The average strategy profiles’ exploitability was measured
at regular intervals.
Leduc Hold’em Figure 5.3 compares both algorithms’ performance in 6- and 60-
card Leduc Hold’em, where the card decks consist of 3 and 30 ranks with 2 suits
respectively. While XFP clearly outperformed FSP in the small 6-card variant, in
the larger 60-card Leduc Hold’em it learned more slowly. This might be expected,
as the computation per iteration of XFP scales linearly in the squared number of
cards. FSP, on the other hand, operates only on information states whose number
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of XFP and table-lookup FSP in Leduc Hold’em with 6 and 60
cards. The inset presents the results using a logarithmic scale for both axes.
scales linearly with the number of cards in the game.
River Poker We compared the algorithms in two instances of River Poker, a sim-
plified model of an end-game situation in Limit Texas Hold’em. We set the potsize
to 6, allowed at most 1 raise and used a fixed set of community cards1. The first in-
stance assumes uninformed, uniform beliefs of the players that assigns equal prob-
ability to each possible holding. The second instance assumes that players have
inferred beliefs over their opponents’ holdings. An expert poker player has pro-
vided us with belief distributions that model a real Texas Hold’em scenario, where
the first player called a raise preflop, check/raised on the flop and bet the turn. The
distributions assume that player 1 holds one of 14% of the possible holdings 2 with
probability 0.99 and a uniform random holding with probability 0.01. Similarly,
player 2 is likely to hold one of 32% holdings 3.
According to figure 5.4, FSP improved its average strategy profile much faster
1KhTc7d5sJh
2K4s-K2s,KTo-K3o,QTo-Q9o,J9o+,T9o,T7o,98o,96o
3QQ-JJ,99-88,66,AQs-A5s,K6s,K4s-K2s,QTs,Q7s,JTs,J7s,T8s+,T6s-T2s,97s,87s,72s+,AQo-
A5o,K6o,K4o-K2o,QTo,Q7o,JTo,J7o,T8o+,T6o-T4o,97o,87o,75o+
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of XFP and table-lookup FSP in River poker. The inset presents
the results using a logarithmic scale for both axes.
than the full-width variant in both instances of River poker. In River poker with
defined beliefs, FSP obtained an exploitability of 0.05 after 33 seconds, whereas
after 300 seconds XFP was exploitable by more than 0.09. Furthermore, XFP’s
performance was similar in both instances of River poker, whereas FSP lowered its
exploitability by more than 40%, when defined beliefs were used.
River poker has about 10 million states but only around 4000 information
states. For a similar reason as in the Leduc Hold’em experiments, this might ex-
plain the overall better performance of FSP. Furthermore, the structure of the game
assigns non-zero probability to each state of the game and thus the computational
cost of XFP is the same for both instances of River poker. It performs computation
at each state no matter how likely it is to occur. FSP on the other hand is guided
by sampling and is therefore able to focus its computation on likely scenarios. This
allows it to benefit from the additional structure introduced by the players’ beliefs
into the game.
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5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have introduced FSP, a sample-based machine learning ap-
proach to learning Nash equilibria from self-play. FSP is designed to approximate
extensive-form fictitious play. It can be instantiated with a variety of classic, single-
agent reinforcement learning and standard supervised learning methods.
Our experiments on two poker games have shown that sample-based FSP out-
performed full-width XFP in games with a large number of cards as well as non-
uniform belief distributions. We have attributed this success to two factors. Firstly,
reinforcement learning agents only observe their respective information states and
thus implicitly average over states that they can’t distinguish. XFP, which scales in
the number of games states rather than information states, can be more adversely
affected by an increase in the size of the game. Secondly, for non-uniform belief
distributions some states of the game can be more likely and important. A sample-
based approach can exploit this by sampling and focusing on these potentially more
important states.
While FSP’s strategy updates would asymptotically converge to the desired
strategies, it remains an open question whether guaranteed convergence can be
achieved with a finite computational budget per iteration. However, we have pre-
sented some intuition why this might be the case and our experiments provide first
empirical evidence that the resulting approximation erors indeed decay in practice.
This chapter’s table-lookup methods have barely tapped into FSP’s potential.
Function approximation can provide automated abstraction and generalisation in
large extensive-form games. Continuous-action reinforcement learning can learn
best responses in continuous action spaces. FSP may, therefore, scale to large and
even continuous-action game-theoretic applications. The next chapter provides ev-
idence of this claim, by combining FSP with deep learning techniques and success-
fully applying it to a large-scale game.
Chapter 6
Practical Issues in Fictitious Self-Play
In this chapter we address our main research question (see Section 1.2).
6.1 Introduction
Common game-theoretic methods (Section 2.3.4), XFP (Section 4.4) and table-
lookup FSP (Section 5.5.2) lack the ability to learn abstract patterns and use them
to generalise across related information states. This results in limited scalability to
large games, unless the domain is abstracted to a manageable size, typically using
human expert knowledge, heuristics or modelling. This domain knowledge is ex-
pensive and hard to come by. Thus, relying on it prevents self-play learning methods
from scaling at the pace of computational technology.
In this chapter we introduce NFSP, a deep reinforcement learning method for
learning approximate Nash equilibria of imperfect-information games without prior
domain knowledge. NFSP combines FSP with neural network function approxima-
tion. We begin by exploring fictitious play with anticipatory dynamics. These dy-
namics enable fictitious self-players to learn simultaneously by letting them choose
a mixture of their average strategy and best response strategy. We then introduce
the Online FSP Agent, an online reinforcement learner for FSP. Finally, we set
up NFSP as a multi-agent learning domain of simultaneously learning Online FSP
Agents that use neural networks to represent their average and best-response poli-
cies. These agents train their networks by deep learning from memorized experi-
ence. We empirically evaluate the convergence of NFSP in Leduc Hold’em and
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compare it to DQN’s performance. We also apply NFSP to LHE, a game of real-
world scale, and visualize the neural representations (abstractions) it has learned.
6.2 Simultaneous Learning
The Batch FSP Algorithm 6 required a meta controller that coordinated FSP agents
so that that they appropriately sampled experience to approximate fictitious play.
From an artifical intelligence and multi-agent learning perspective, this is some-
what unappealing. If individual agents could autonomously learn a Nash equilib-
rium from simultaneous experience of their uncoordinated interaction, this would
provide an example of how such strategies might arise in practice. Furthermore,
there are also practical advantages to simultaneous learning. First, sampling expe-
rience simultaneously rather than alternatingly, in principle, is n times more sample
efficient, where n is the number of agents. Second, simultaneously learning agents
can be directly applied to a real-world black-box environment, such as a city’s traffic
lights system.
If we want all agents to learn simultaneously while playing against each other,
we face the following dilemma. In principle, each agent could play its average
policy, pi , and learn a best response with off-policy Q-learning, i.e. evaluate and
maximise its action values, Qi(s,a)≈Eβ i,pi−i
[
Git
∣∣St = s,At = a], of playing its best
response policy β i against its fellow agents’ average strategy profile, pi−i. However,
in this case the agent would not generate any experience of its own best response
behaviour, β i, which is needed to train its average policy, pi i, that approximates the
agent’s average of past best responses.
To address this problem, we propose an approximation of anticipatory dy-
namics of continuous-time dynamic fictitious play (Shamma and Arslan, 2005).
In this variant of fictitious play, players choose best responses to a short-term
prediction of their fellow agents’ (anticipated) average normal-form strategies,
Π−it +η ddtΠ
−i
t , where η ∈ R is the anticipatory parameter. The authors show
that for appropriate, game-dependent choice of η stability of fictitious play at equi-
librium points can be improved. We use Bik+1−Πik ≈ ddkΠik as a discrete-time ap-
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proximation of the derivative that is used in the anticipatory dynamics. Note that
∆Πik ∝ B
i
k+1−Πik is indeed the normal-form update direction of common discrete-
time fictitious play.
6.3 Online FSP Agent
We introduce the Online FSP Agent, an online reinforcement learner for simul-
taneous FSP with anticipatory dynamics. Online FSP agents choose their actions
from the mixture policy σ ≡ (1−η)Π+ηB. This enables each agent to compute
an approximate best response, β i, to its fellow agents’ anticipated average strategy
profile, σ−i ≡ Π−i+η(B−i−Π−i), by iteratively evaluating and maximising their
action values, Qi(s,a) ≈ Eβ i,σ−i
[
Git
∣∣St = s,At = a]. Additionally, as each agent’s
own best response policy is now sampled (in proportion to the anticipatory param-
eter), they can now learn their average policy from that experience. Algorithm 8
presents a general Online FSP Agent, that can be instantiated with a variety of rein-
forcement and supervised learning methods.
6.4 Neural Fictitious Self-Play
.
NFSP deploys individual deep-learning Online FSP Agents to represent the
self-playing intelligence from all players’ points of view. It implements a multi-
agent interpretation of self-play.
Deep Learning Best Responses DQN is an off-policy deep reinforcement learning
approach for MDP environments (Mnih et al., 2015). As before (see FSP Chapter
5), we can directly plug the algorithm into the FSP framework and thus utilise it to
learn approximate best responses.
DQN agents learn an ε-greedy policy by deep fitted Q-learning from replayed
experience (Mnih et al., 2015). Similarly, FSP agents can learn approximate best re-
sponses with the DQN algorithm applied to their reinforcement learning memories.
In particular, the agent trains a neural network, Q(s,a;θQ), to predict action val-
ues from experience of play against its fellow agents’ (recent) anticipated average
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Algorithm 8 Online FSP Agent
Initialize replay memoriesMRL (circular buffer) andMSL (reservoir)
Initialize average policy pi
Initialize best-response policy β
Initialize anticipatory parameter η
for each episode do
Set policy σ ←
{
β , with probability η
pi, with probability 1−η
Observe initial information state s1 and reward r1
for t = 1,T do
Sample action at from policy σ
Execute action at in environment and observe reward rt+1 and next infor-
mation state st+1
Store transition (st ,at ,rt+1,st+1) in reinforcement learning memoryMRL
if following best response policy σ = β then
Store behaviour tuple (st ,at) in supervised learning memoryMSL
end if
Update pi with supervised learning on experience of own average be-
haviour,MSL
Update β with reinforcement learning on experience of interactions with
environment,MRL
end for
end for
strategies. This is achieved with stochastic gradient descent on the mean squared
error,
L
(
θQ
)
= E(s,a,r,s′)∼MRL
[(
r+max
a′
Q(s′,a′;θQ
′
)−Q(s,a;θQ)
)2]
, (6.1)
where θQ′ are the fitted network parameters, i.e. we periodically update θQ′ ← θQ.
The resulting network defines the agent’s approximate best response strategy,
β = ε-greedy
[
Q(· ;θQ)
]
, (6.2)
which selects a random action with probability ε and otherwise chooses the action
that maximises the predicted action values.
Deep Learning Average Strategies Multinomial logistic regression is a common
technique for learning from demonstrations (Argall et al., 2009). We apply this
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method to learning average policies from the agents’ respective supervised learning
memories. These memories effectively contain demonstrations produced by the
agents’ own past best responses.
The agent’s average policy is represented by a neural network, Π(s,a;θΠ),
that maps states to a Softmax output of action probabilities. The network is trained
to imitate the agent’s own past best response behaviour by multinomial logistic
regression applied to its supervised learning memory, MSL. In particular, we use
stochastic gradient descent on the negative log-probability of past actions taken,
L (θΠ) = E(s,a)∼MSL
[− logΠ(s,a;θΠ)] . (6.3)
The agent’s average policy is defined by the network’s Softmax outputs,
pi(a |s) =Π(s,a;θΠ). (6.4)
Algorithm NFSP, presented in Algorithm 9, executes deep-learning instances of
the Online FSP Agent (Algorithm 8) for each player in the game. As these agents
interact, they learn their own average strategies and (approximate) best responses
to their fellow agents’ anticipated average strategies. Thus, NFSP is a simultaneous
self-play instance of FSP (Algorithm 5).
6.5 Encoding a Poker Environment
Observations One of our goals is to minimise reliance on prior knowledge. There-
fore, we attempt to define an objective encoding of information states in poker
games. In particular, we do not engineer any higher-level features. Poker games
usually consist of multiple rounds. At each round new cards are revealed to the
players. We represent each rounds’ cards by a k-of-n encoding. For example, LHE
has a card deck of 52 cards and on the second round three cards are revealed. Thus,
this round is encoded with a vector of length 52 and three elements set to 1 and
the rest to 0. In Limit Hold’em poker games, players usually have three actions to
choose from, namely {fold, call, raise}. Note that depending on context, calls and
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Algorithm 9 Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) with DQN
Initialize game Γ and execute an agent via RUNAGENT for each player in the
game
function RUNAGENT(Γ)
Initialize replay memoriesMRL (circular buffer) andMSL (reservoir)
Initialize average-policy network Π(s,a;θΠ) with random parameters θΠ
Initialize action-value network Q(s,a;θQ) with random parameters θQ
Initialize target network parameters θQ′ ← θQ
Initialize anticipatory parameter η
for each episode do
Set policy σ ←
{
ε-greedy(Q) , with probability η
Π, with probability 1−η
Observe initial information state s1 and reward r1
for t = 1,T do
Sample action at from policy σ
Execute action at in game and observe reward rt+1 and next informa-
tion state st+1
Store transition (st ,at ,rt+1,st+1) in reinforcement learning memory
MRL
if agent follows best response policy σ = ε-greedy(Q) then
Store behaviour tuple (st ,at) in supervised learning memoryMSL
end if
Update θΠ with stochastic gradient descent on loss
L (θΠ) = E(s,a)∼MSL
[− logΠ(s,a;θΠ)]
Update θQ with stochastic gradient descent on loss
L
(
θQ
)
= E(s,a,r,s′)∼MRL
[(
r+maxa′Q(s′,a′;θQ
′
)−Q(s,a;θQ)
)2]
Periodically update target network parameters θQ′ ← θQ
end for
end for
end function
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raises can be referred to as checks and bets respectively. Betting is capped at a fixed
number of raises per round. Thus, we can represent the betting history as a tensor
with 4 dimensions, namely {player, round, number of raises, action taken}. E.g.
heads-up LHE contains 2 players, 4 rounds, 0 to 4 raises per round and 3 actions.
Thus we can represent a LHE betting history as a 2×4×5×3 tensor. In a heads-up
game we do not need to encode the fold action, as a two-player game always ends
if one player gives up. Thus, we can flatten the 4-dimensional tensor to a vector
of length 80. Concatenating with the card inputs of 4 rounds, we encode an infor-
mation state of LHE as a vector of length 288. Similarly, an information state of
Leduc Hold’em can be encoded as a vector of length 30, as it contains 6 cards with
3 duplicates, 2 rounds, 0 to 2 raises per round and 3 actions.
Actions Fixed-limit poker variants limit the number of players’ bets per round.
Thus, a raise is illegal once such limit is reached. Furthermore, a fold may be con-
sidered illegal if the agent does not face any prior bet, e.g. common poker software
deactivates this action for human players. We address these issues by modifying the
environment. In particular, an illegal raise or fold is automatically results in a call.
Thus, the environment is effectively offering two duplicate actions to the agent in
those cases.
Rewards We directly map players’ monetary payoffs to rewards, i.e. a loss of 1
monetary unit corresponds to a reward of−1. The agents’ betting during an episode
yield intermediate rewards. For example, if an agent bet 2 units on the flop, this
would result in an immediate reward of −2, which the agent would experience to-
gether with its observation of the next information state. Alternatively, total rewards
could be distributed only at the end of an episode.
6.6 Experiments
We evaluate NFSP and related algorithms in Leduc and Limit Texas Hold’em poker
games.
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6.6.1 Leduc Hold’em
We empirically investigate the convergence of NFSP to Nash equilibria in Leduc
Hold’em. We also study whether removing or altering some of NFSP’s components
breaks convergence.
First, we explored high-level architectural and parameter choices for NFSP in
preliminary experiments on Leduc Hold’em. In this initial exploration we found
rectified linear activations to perform better than alternative activation functions,
e.g. tanh or sigmoid. Furthermore, network architectures with one hidden layer of
64 neurons appeared to be a sweet spot that fabourably traded off network size and
resulting computational cost against achieved performance, i.e. low exploitability.
Second, we manually tuned the NFSP parameters in further preliminary experi-
ments on Leduc Hold’em for a fully connected neural network with 1 hidden layer
of 64 neurons and rectified linear activations. In particular, we varied single or small
subsets of parameters at a time and measured the resulting achieved exploitability.
We fixed the best calibration we could find and then repeated learning in Leduc
Hold’em for various network architectures with the same parameters. In particular,
we set the sizes of memories to 200k and 2m forMRL andMSL respectively. MRL
functioned as a circular buffer containing a recent window of experience. MSL was
updated with reservoir sampling (Vitter, 1985). The reinforcement and supervised
learning rates were set to 0.1 and 0.005, and both used vanilla SGD without mo-
mentum for stochastic optimisation of the neural networks. Each agent performed 2
stochastic gradient updates of mini-batch size 128 per network for every 128 steps
in the game. The target network of the DQN algorithm was refitted every 300 up-
dates. NFSP’s anticipatory parameter was set to η = 0.1. The ε-greedy policies’
exploration started at 0.06 and decayed to 0, proportionally to the inverse square
root of the number of iterations.
Figure 6.1 shows NFSP approaching Nash equilibria for various network archi-
tectures. We observe a monotonic performance increase with size of the networks.
NFSP achieved an exploitability of 0.06, which full-width XFP typically achieves
after around 1000 full-width iterations.
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Figure 6.1: Learning performance of NFSP in Leduc Hold’em for various network sizes.
In order to investigate the relevance of various components of NFSP, e.g. reser-
voir sampling and anticipatory dynamics, we conducted an experiment that isolated
their effects. Figure 6.2 shows that these modifications led to decremental perfor-
mance. In particular, using a fixed-size sliding window to store experience of the
agents’ own behaviour led to divergence. NFSP’s performance plateaued for a high
anticipatory parameter of 0.5, that most likely violates the game-dependent stabil-
ity conditions of dynamic fictitious play (Shamma and Arslan, 2005). Finally, using
exponentially-averaged reservoir sampling for supervised learning memory updates
led to noisy performance.
6.6.2 Comparison to DQN
Several stable algorithms have previously been proposed for deep reinforcement
learning, notably the DQN algorithm (Mnih et al., 2015). However, the empirical
stability of these algorithms was only previously established in single-agent, perfect
(or near-perfect) information MDPs. Here, we investigate the stability of DQN in
multi-agent, imperfect-information games, in comparison to NFSP.
DQN learns a deterministic, greedy strategy. Such strategies are sufficient to
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Figure 6.2: Breaking learning performance in Leduc Hold’em by removing essential com-
ponents of NFSP.
behave optimally in single-agent domains, i.e. MDPs for which DQN was designed.
However, imperfect-information games generally require stochastic strategies to
achieve optimal behaviour. One might wonder if the average behaviour of DQN
converges to a Nash equilibrium. To test this, we augmented DQN with a super-
vised learning memory and train a neural network to estimate its average strategy.
Unlike NFSP, the average strategy does not affect the agent’s behaviour in any way;
it is passively observing the DQN agent to estimate its evolution over time. We
implement this variant of DQN by using NFSP with an anticipatory parameter of
η = 1. We trained DQN with all combinations of the following parameters: Learn-
ing rate {0.2,0.1,0.05}, decaying exploration starting at {0.06,0.12} and reinforce-
ment learning memory {2m reservoir,2m sliding window}. Other parameters were
fixed to the same values as NFSP; note that these parameters only affect the passive
observation process. We then chose the best-performing result and compared to
NFSP’s performance that was achieved in the previous section’s experiment. DQN
achieved its best-performing result with a learning rate of 0.2, exploration starting
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Figure 6.3: Comparing performance to DQN in Leduc Hold’em.
at 0.12 and a sliding window memory of size 2m.
Figure 6.3 shows that DQN’s deterministic strategy is highly exploitable,
which is expected as imperfect-information games usually require stochastic poli-
cies. DQN’s average behaviour does not approach a Nash equilibrium either. In
principle, DQN also learns a best-response to the historical experience generated by
fellow agents. So why does it perform worse than NFSP? The problem is that DQN
agents exclusively generate self-play experience according to their ε-greedy strate-
gies. These experiences are both highly correlated over time, and highly focused on
a narrow distribution of states. In contrast, NFSP agents use an ever more slowly
changing (anticipated) average policy to generate self-play experience. Thus, their
experience varies more smoothly, resulting in a more stable data distribution, and
therefore more stable neural networks. Note that this issue is not limited to DQN;
other common reinforcement learning methods have been shown to exhibit similarly
stagnating performance in poker games, e.g. UCT (see Section 3.5.2).
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6.6.3 Limit Texas Hold’em
We applied NFSP to LHE, a game that is popular with humans. Since in 2008 a
computer program beat expert human LHE players for the first time in a public
competition, modern computer agents are widely considered to have achieved su-
perhuman performance (Newall, 2013). The game was essentially solved by Bowl-
ing et al. (2015). We evaluated our agents against the top 3 computer programs of
the most recent (2014) ACPC that featured LHE. Learning performance was mea-
sured in milli-big-blinds won per hand, mbb/h, i.e. one thousandth of a big blind
that players post at the beginning of a hand.
We successively tried 9 configurations of NFSP in LHE. The configurations’
parameters were chosen based on intuition and experience from the respective prior
runs in LHE as well as our experiments in Leduc Hold’em. We achieved the best
performance with the following parameters. The neural networks were fully con-
nected with four hidden layers of 1024,512,1024 and 512 neurons with rectified
linear activations. The memory sizes were set to 600k and 30m for MRL and MSL
respectively. MRL functioned as a circular buffer containing a recent window of
experience. MSL was updated with exponentially-averaged reservoir sampling (Os-
borne et al., 2014), replacing entries in MSL with minimum probability 0.25. We
used vanilla SGD without momentum for both reinforcement and supervised learn-
ing, with learning rates set to 0.1 and 0.01 respectively. Each agent performed 2
stochastic gradient updates of mini-batch size 256 per network for every 256 steps
in the game. The target network was refitted every 1000 updates. NFSP’s anticipa-
tory parameter was set to η = 0.1. The ε-greedy policies’ exploration started at 0.08
and decayed to 0, more slowly than in Leduc Hold’em. In addition to NFSP’s main,
average strategy profile we also evaluated the best response and greedy-average
strategies, which deterministically choose actions that maximise the predicted ac-
tion values or probabilities respectively.
To provide some intuition for win rates in heads-up LHE, a player that always
folds will lose 750 mbb/h, and expert human players typically achieve expected
win rates of 40-60 mbb/h at online high-stakes games. Similarly, the top half of
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Figure 6.4: Win rates of NFSP against SmooCT in Limit Texas Hold’em. The estimated
standard error of each evaluation is less than 10 mbb/h.
Match-up Win rate (mbb/h)
escabeche -52.1 ± 8.5
SmooCT -17.4 ± 9.0
Hyperborean -13.6 ± 9.2
Table 6.1: Win rates of NFSP’s greedy-average strategy against the top 3 agents of the
ACPC 2014.
computer agents in the ACPC 2014 achieved up to 50 mbb/h between themselves.
While training, we periodically evaluated NFSP’s performance against SmooCT
from symmetric play for 25000 hands each. Figure 6.4 presents the learning per-
formance of NFSP. NFSP’s average and greedy-average strategy profiles exhibit a
stable and relatively monotonic performance improvement, and achieve win rates
of around -50 and -20 mbb/h respectively. The best response strategy profile exhib-
ited more noisy performance, mostly ranging between -50 and 0 mbb/h. We also
evaluated the final greedy-average strategy against the other top 3 competitors of
the ACPC 2014. Table 6.1 presents the results. NFSP achieves winrates similar to
those of the top half of computer agents in the ACPC 2014 and thus is competitive
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with superhuman computer poker programs.
6.7 Visualization of a Poker-Playing Neural Network
To analyse the features (abstractions) that NFSP learned for LHE, we visualized the
neural networks’ last hidden layers’ activations with the t-SNE algorithm (Maaten
and Hinton, 2008). In particular, by simulating games of NFSP’s final average strat-
egy profile, we created a data set consisting of the information states, the last hidden
layers’ activations, the output action probabilities and various custom features. We
applied the t-SNE algorithm to about 100000 vectors of the networks’ activations
for both players respectively. We used the information state descriptions, action
probabilities and custom features to illustrate the embeddings.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 present both players’ embeddings with various colourings.
We observe that the activations cluster by the game’s rounds and the players’ local
policies (action probabilities). It is interesting to see the colour gradients between
the fold and call actions as well the call and raise actions. Indeed, in many poker sit-
uations human players would gradually switch from call to fold (or raise) based on
their hand strength. The embeddings also appear to group states based on whether
the respective player has the initiative, i.e. was the last to bet or raise. This is a
common strategic feature that is taught in many books on poker strategy (Sklansky,
1999). Finally, situations with similar pot sizes are mapped to nearby locations. The
pot size is strategically important, as it determines the odds that players get on their
bets and thus their optimal action frequencies.
Figure 6.7 presents a selection of game situations from the first player’s em-
bedding. Group A shows clusters of pocket pairs that the network tends to raise
preflop against a call. Group B presents pairs that player 1 check/called on the flop
and turn after defending his big blind preflop (call against a raise). In this situation
the player is now facing a final bet on the river (last round). The colouring suggests
that the network gradually moves from a call to a fold based on the quality of the
pair (middle pair to bottom pair). Group C shows pairs that player 1 holds facing a
bet on the flop after defending his big blind preflop. This is one of the most com-
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mon situations in heads-up LHE. Indeed, these situations’ embedding appears to
form a prominent ridged structure. The colouring suggests that the network gradu-
ally switches from a call to a raise, based on the quality of the pair (bottom to top
pair). Group D presents straight draws on the turn, i.e. four cards to a straight that
are worthless unless a matching fifth card completes the hand on the river. Group E
presents straight draws that player 1 has bet with as a bluff on the turn and is now
facing a decision on the river after his draw did not complete to a straight. Both
groups, D and E, suggest that the network has learned features that encode straight
draws. Furthermore, the mapping of these bluffs to similar features may enable the
agent to identify situations in which it was bluffing.
Figure 6.8 presents a selection of game situations from the second player’s em-
bedding. Group A shows high cards1 that face a bet on the river after the turn was
checked by both players. This is a common situation where the player has to decide
whether their relatively weak holding might be sufficient to win the pot. Indeed, the
colouring suggests that the network gradually moves from a fold to a call based on
the quality of the high cards. Group B presents high cards that face a check/raise
after having placed a bet on the flop. Again we see a gradual switch from fold to call
based on the quality of the high cards. The examples indicate that the network would
fold weak high-card holdings that have little hope for improvement. Furthermore, it
would continue with high-card holdings that can beat a bluff and have some chance
for improvement. Group C presents a variety of diamond and spade flushes2, sug-
gesting that the network has learned features that encode flushes. Group D presents
a variety of straight draws that face a bet on the flop, providing further evidence for
the network having learned features that encode this category of holdings. Group E
shows a variety of bluffs that have either bet (first four examples) or raised the turn
(last four examples). In these situations the network faces a check on the river and
has to decide whether to follow through with its bluff. Mapping these situations to
similar feature vectors may enable the agent to learn decisions on following through
with bluffs on the river. When to follow through with a bluff is a common question
1Cards that have not formed a pair or better.
2Five cards of the same suit.
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amongst amateur as well as expert players in the poker community.
The illustrations and discussion suggest that the network learned to represent
a variety of specific domain knowledge (card rankings such as pairs, straights and
flushes), strategic concepts (bluffs, check/raises, playing strong hands aggressively
and weak hands passively) and even heuristic features that human experts use, e.g.
initiative.
6.8 Conclusion
We have introduced NFSP, an end-to-end deep reinforcement learning approach to
learning approximate Nash equilibria of imperfect-information games from self-
play. Unlike previous game-theoretic methods, NFSP learns solely from game
outcomes without prior domain knowledge. Unlike previous deep reinforcement
learning methods, NFSP is capable of learning (approximate) Nash equilibria in
imperfect-information games. Our experiments have shown NFSP to converge reli-
ably to approximate Nash equilibria in a small poker game, whereas DQN’s greedy
and average strategies did not. In LHE, a poker game of real-world scale, NFSP
learnt a strategy that approached the performance of state-of-the-art, superhuman
algorithms based on significant domain expertise. To our knowledge, this is the
first time that any reinforcement learning algorithm, learning solely from game out-
comes without prior knowledge, has demonstrated such a result. Furthermore, the
visualization of the learned neural networks has empirically demonstrated NFSP’s
capability to learn richly featured abstractions end to end.
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Figure 6.5: t-SNE embeddings of the first player’s last hidden layer activations. The em-
beddings are coloured by A) action probabilities; B) round of the game; C)
initiative feature; D) pot size in big bets (logarithmic scale).
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Figure 6.6: t-SNE embeddings of the second player’s last hidden layer activations. The
embeddings are coloured by A) action probabilities; B) round of the game; C)
initiative feature; D) pot size in big bets (logarithmic scale).
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Figure 6.7: A) pairs preflop vs call; B) pairs check/calling down from flop after big-blind
defense (rc/crc/crc/cr); C) pairs on flop facing continuation bet after big-blind
defense (rc/cr); D) straight draws facing a bet on the turn; E) uncompleted
straight draws on the river after having bluff-bet the turn.
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Figure 6.8: A) high cards vs river bet after check through turn; B) high cards facing
check/raise on flop after continuation bet (rc/crr); C) flushes facing a check;
D) straight draws facing a bet on the flop; E) facing check on river after having
bluff-raised (first four) or bluff-bet (last four) the turn.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
We set out to address the question,
Can an agent feasibly learn approximate Nash equilibria of large-scale
imperfect-information games from self-play?
In this chapter, we discuss our contributions towards answering this question. We
also present an outlook on the future of self-play.
7.1 Contributions
We first critically review our contributions and then contextualize them.
7.1.1 Review
Smooth UCT (Chapter 3) introduced the notion of fictitious play into UCT, a pop-
ular Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm. Our work on Smooth UCT can
be regarded as a proof of concept. It empirically demonstrated that the combi-
nation of fictitious play with reinforcement leaning can indeed learn high-quality
approximate Nash equilibria in sequential, imperfect-information games. While the
algorithm was practically successful in the 2014 Annual Computer Poker Compe-
tition (ACPC), our subsequent work on Extensive-Form Fictitious Play (XFP) and
Fictitious Self-Play (FSP) has revealed that it might not have a sound theoretical
foundation. In principle, this flaw could be fixed by modifying Smooth UCT to an
FSP algorithm1.
1This could be achieved with alternating self-play and a forgetting variant of UCT, e.g. similar
to sliding-window or discounted UCB (Garivier and Moulines, 2008)
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XFP (Chapter 4) extends fictitious play to sequential games. In particular, it
achieves the same convergence guarantees as its single-step (normal-form) coun-
terpart. Moreover, it represents agents’ policies in a sequential (extensive) form.
Thus, XFP is useful as a blueprint for designing sequential decision making algo-
rithms, e.g. reinforcement learning, that converge in self-play.
FSP (Chapter 5) extends XFP to learning from sampled experience, which is es-
sential to take on large-scale domains that are not exhaustively enumerable. In
order to generalise to unseen, i.e. non-sampled, situations, FSP proposes the use
of machine learning. In particular, FSP replaces the two full-width computations
of XFP, i.e. best response computation and policy averaging, with reinforcement
and supervised learning respectively. Furthermore, classical reinforcement and su-
pervised learning techniques, which are designed for stationary environments, can
be utilised. While we empirically investigated FSP’s approximation errors and con-
vergence, we did not prove theoretical guarantees for its convergence with a finite
computational budget per iteration.
NFSP (Chapter 6) instantiates FSP with neural-network function approximation
and deep learning techniques. In Limit Texas Hold’em, a large-scale poker game,
Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) approached the performance of state-of-the-art,
superhuman algorithms based on significant domain expertise. To our knowledge,
this is the first time that any reinforcement learning agent, learning solely from its
own experience without prior domain knowledge, has demonstrated such a result in
a large-scale game of imperfect information.
7.1.2 Contexts
Perfect to Imperfect Information TD-Gammon (Tesauro, 1995) and AlphaGo
(Silver et al., 2016a) achieved superhuman performance in perfect-information
games by reinforcement learning from self-play. NFSP achieved a similar result
in a real-world-scale imperfect-information game. This is a step towards other real-
world applications, which typically involve imperfect information.
Handcrafted to Learned Abstractions Many game-theoretic approaches for com-
puting Nash equilibria typically solve handcrafted abstractions of the game (Johan-
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son et al., 2013), i.e. approximate it first. In contrast, NFSP agents experientally
learn approximate Nash equilibria and an (implicit) abstraction end to end, i.e. from
the raw inputs of the environment. A visualization of the agents’ neural networks
(abstractions) revealed that they encoded complex strategic features akin to those a
domain expert might choose to craft by hand (see Section 6.7).
Experiential Learning from a Black Box With the exception of Outcome Sam-
pling (OS) (Lanctot et al., 2009), many game-theoretic methods for computing Nash
equilibria require explicit knowledge of the game’s dynamics. In contrast, FSP and
NFSP are experiential reinforcement learning approaches that can be applied to a
black box of the game, e.g. learn real-time in a traffic lights system from raw camera
inputs.
Realisation of Nash Equilibria Game theory has raised the question of how and
whether Nash equilibria are realised in practice (Harsanyi, 1973; Selten, 1975; Fu-
denberg and Levine, 1995). Leslie and Collins (2006) provided an example of how
agents interacting in a single-step game might converge on a Nash equilibrium.
NFSP provides a similar example for sequential games. The learning process can
be interpreted as habituation to a routine policy, which averages policies that were
deemed optimal in the past. Such process is reminiscent of an actor-critic architec-
ture (Barto et al., 1983).
7.2 Future of Self-Play
Local Planning Learning in a model of a subgame2, in the hope of transferring a
policy to the real environment, is known as local planning. By refining an agent’s
policy from self-play in the currently encountered subgame, local planning has been
incredibly successful in perfect-information games, e.g. Chess (Campbell et al.,
2002) or Go (Gelly et al., 2012; Silver et al., 2016a). In imperfect-information
games, however, strictly local3 planning does not generally recover a global Nash
equilibrium (Burch et al., 2014; Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2015; Lisy´ et al., 2015).
The consequences of this issue and how they could be overcome, e.g. global search
2A subgame encompasses a subset of locally relevant game situations.
3Sampling from the planning agents beliefs about the state of the game.
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targeting (Lisy´ et al., 2015), present a promising avenue of research.
Moravcˇı´k et al. (2017) have recently4 presented DeepStack, an approach to lo-
cal planning based on decomposition of imperfect-information games (Burch et al.,
2014). They utilise deep learning from approximate, game-theoretic solutions of the
game in order to innovatively bootstrap depth-limited, local planning in imperfect-
information games. A key aspect of this approach is to compactly summarize a
global Nash equilibrium with a set of counterfactual values and probabilities of re-
alising information states (Burch et al., 2014; Moravcˇı´k et al., 2017). This compact
summary of a Nash equilibrium, however, may be hard to come by as it requires
prior approximate solutions of the game. Furthermore, unlike in perfect-information
games, local planning in imperfect-information games may not recover from an in-
accurate compact summary of the Nash equilibrium.
We may want to investigate the following questions. As DeepStack relies on
a quality summary of the global Nash equilibrium, are there alternative approaches
to (semi-)local planning that do not have such requirements? For example, if there
was a mutually-observed state in the sequence of play should we rather plan from
that prior state, not requiring any compact summary of a Nash equilbrium? Do
such mutually-observed states commonly occur in real-world imperfect-information
games? Examples may include entering a new room with different people, tempo-
rary occlusions or synchronizing information through communication. Finally, how
should we plan locally in general-sum multi-player games, e.g. by using player
beliefs (Cowling et al., 2015) or equilibrium selection (Nash and Shapley, 1950;
Szafron et al., 2013)? In particular, are there any performance guarantees of multi-
player Nash equilibria that would justify a need for local planning that is able to
recover global Nash equilibria?
Temporal Abstraction In principle, an environment defines an agent’s primitive ac-
tions at the finest granularity, e.g. muscle controls. A great many such actions might
be required to perform a higher-level action such as taking a three-point shot (rather
than passing) in basketball. Arguably, strategic decision making (in the multi-agent
4This work was published after the defence of this thesis.
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sense) is mainly important at such higher levels of decisions. This is because primi-
tive or lower-level actions might have negligible reciprocal effects on fellow agents.
Therefore, temporal abstraction, e.g. hierarchical reinforcement learning (Dayan
and Hinton, 1993; Sutton et al., 1999b; Dietterich, 2000; Barto and Mahadevan,
2003), may be of particular importance to strategic decision making.
We may want to investigate the following questions. We may see full-game
strategies as the most temporally extended courses of action, i.e. options. Con-
sequently, a normal-form game would be a temporal abstraction. Can an agent
learn such a normal-form, temporal abstraction from experience in an extensive-
form game? In particular, how does it decide which learned strategies to put in the
abstract normal-form action set? For example, fictitious play could be considered
adding all past best responses. Is there a small set of distinctive strategies (options)
that would enable effective strategic reasoning, i.e. a kind of basis for the strategic
space of the game (Bosansky et al., 2014)? Does learning finer-grained temporal
abstractions in an extensive-form game pose the same challenges as temporal ab-
straction in sequential single-agent domains (McGovern and Barto, 2001; Mannor
et al., 2004; Konidaris et al., 2010; Castro and Precup, 2011)? In particular, are
there any challenges that are specific to multi-agent strategic decision making? For
example, could mutually-observed states not only serve as natural roots for local
planning (see above) but also define strategic termination conditions of options?
Game Models To learn from self-play, an agent requires a model of a multi-agent
environment. Learning multi-agent models poses distinctive challenges. In con-
trast to learning a model of a single-agent environment (Sutton, 1990; Lin, 1992;
Silver et al., 2016b), a multi-agent model would have to identify fellow agents,
i.e. assumed intelligences. Furthermore, such a model includes not only possible
information states and actions of fellow agents but also beliefs about their subjec-
tive reward signals. Learning Nash equilibria in such models touches on questions
of bounded rationality (Simon, 1972; Selten, 1990), e.g. a fellow agent might be
irrational or just optimising an unconventional reward signal.
A learned multi-agent model could also include likely or definite behaviours
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that fellow agents are assumed to exhibit (Johanson et al., 2008). Thus, there is
a continuum from the static, self-play approach (Sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3) to the
adaptive approach (Section 1.1.1) in strategic decision making. At one extreme,
only the choices of fellow agents are modelled, without any assumptions on their
likelihood. At the other extreme, a completely defined model of fellow agents’
policies is learned. The latter model is a Markov decision process that can be solved
with typical (single-agent) reinforcement learning methods. The other models in the
continuum, which leave some choices of fellow agents undetermined, define games
that require an agent to learn from self-play.
We may want to investigate the following questions. Given that all learning
from self-play is model-based, what motivates an agent to learn and solve such a
subjective model in the first place? In particular, should a general reinforcement
learner (Hutter, 2005; Legg, 2008) ever play a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a solution to
a multi-agent model? In the case of the agent lacking a model of fellow agents’
behaviour, couldn’t self-play substitute for such a model by learning reasonable
behaviours from the fellow agents’ points of view? For example, humans may use
a theory of mind (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Yoshida et al., 2008) to plan in
games. How can we enable an artifical agent to learn such a multi-agent model
from experience?
Appendix A
Analysis of Self-Play Policy Iteration
Rational learning from self-play can only converge on Nash equilibria (Bowling
and Veloso, 2001). This chapter presents analyses which suggest that Generalised
Policy Iteration (GPI), a fundamental principle of many reinforcement learning al-
gorithms (Sutton and Barto, 1998), might be unsuitable for convergent learning of
Nash equilibria from self-play in games that are not perfect-information two-player
zero-sum.
A.1 Nash Equilibria of Imperfect-Information Games
We analyse the value functions of a Nash equilibrium and conclude that rational
policy improvement may not be able to represent the equilibrium. Following the
definition of a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951), we know that all actions in the sup-
port of the equlibrium have the same (maximum) value.
Theorem A.1.1. Let pi be a Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form game, i ∈N
any agent of the game and ui ∈ U i any of its information states that has positive
probability of being reached under the equilibrium, pi . Furthermore, let A (ui) ⊆
A (ui) be the agents’s actions in the support of its equilibrium strategy, pi i, at ui.
Then, its action-value function satisfies
Qpi(ui,a) = Qpi(ui,a′) for all a,a′ ∈A (ui),
Qpi(ui,a)≥ Qpi(ui,a′) for all a ∈A (ui),a′ ∈A (ui)
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Proof. If one of the properties was not satisfied, then there would be an action
a∈A (ui) with pi i(a |ui)> 0 such that Qpi(ui,a)< argmaxa′∈A (ui)Qpi(ui,a′), which
violates the assumption that pi is a Nash equilibrium, as the agent would be able to
improve its return.
Consider a policy iteration algorithm that has evaluated the Nash equilibrium
strategy, i.e. computed its value function. Consider policy improvement being per-
formed via a mapping from action-value functions to policies.
Definition A.1.2. A monotonic policy mapping from the action-value function, Q,
to a policy, piQ, satisfies for any information state u
piQ(a |u)> piQ(a′ |u) if Q(u,a)> Q(u,a′),
piQ(a |u) = piQ(a′ |u) if Q(u,a) = Q(u,a′)
It is hard to justify a non-monotonic stochastic policy mapping for a Gener-
alised Policy Iteration (GPI)-based agent from knowledge of the (current) evalu-
ated action-value function alone. Why would it ever prefer actions with lower val-
ues, and why should it choose a non-uniform distribution over same-value actions
(unless it uses a deterministic policy for convenience)? However, Nash equilibria
of imperfect-information games generally require stochastic strategies with non-
uniform distributions, e.g. the equilibrium of Kuhn poker (Kuhn, 1950) balances
players betting frequencies in proportion to the pot size. Thus, both a deterministic
(greedy) as well as a monotonic policy mapping would break a perfectly-evaluated
Nash equilibrium strategy.
We also considered policy gradient methods (Sutton et al., 1999a), which are
an instance of GPI. Each agent’s policy gradient would be zero for a Nash equilib-
rium strategy profile. However, at any information state the action-value function
would be flat across all dimensions of actions in the support of the equilibrium.
There is no curvature that attracts a gradient descent method to the Nash equilib-
rium point. Therefore, an agent learning with a stochastic policy gradient method
(Sutton et al., 1999a) against a fixed Nash equilibrium would not be expected to
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recover a Nash strategy. If all agents learned simultaneously, they might push each
other back towards the equilibrium by penalising deviations. Bowling and Veloso
(2001) demonstrated that this can indeed be achieved if agents dynamically adapt
their learning rates.
A.2 Policy Iteration in Perfect-Information Games
Having discussed the potential unsuitability of policy iteration for self-play learn-
ing in imperfect-information games, we investigate its applicability to games with
perfect information.
A general finite perfect-information game with any number of players can, in
principle, be solved by dynamic programming from the leaves of the game, e.g.
exhaustive Minimax search. It requires only a single exhaustive traversal of the
game tree to compute a Nash equilibrium strategy.
However, consider an iterative learning process based on the same dynamic
programming principles, e.g. GPI. Figure A.1 shows a simple two-player general-
sum game. Consider a policy iteration process that alternates policy evaluation
and greedy policy improvement. If two actions have the same value, then the
greedy action is chosen uniform randomly. Since player two is indifferent between
all of his actions he will randomly choose one of his 4 deterministic strategies,
{Ll,Lr,Rl,Rr}, at each iteration. We make the following observations.
• The iterative policy iteration process never converges as player 1 is forced to
switch his optimal policy infinitely often due to player 2’s infinite (random)
switches.
• The average policies converge but not to a Nash equilibrium. The average
policy of player 2 converges to a uniform random distribution over his actions
at each state. Observe that at each iteration player 2 plays one of his 4 policies
with equal probability. Hence, player 1 will respond with one of four best
responses to player 1’s policies. The average policy of player 1 thus converges
to P(L) = 38 , P(R) =
5
8 . This is not a best response to the average strategy of
player 2. Therefore, the converged average strategies do not form a Nash
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equlibrium.
• Now consider a policy iteration process where players evaluate their policies
against the opponent’s average strategy, i.e. as in fictitious play. In this case, it
is easy to see that player 1 will converge to the pure strategy R, a best response
to player 2’s average strategy. Any strategy of player 2 is a best response as
all yield reward 0. This process thus converges to a Nash equilibrium in this
game.
Figure A.1: A small two-player general-sum game.
We can trivially extend the presented two-player game to a zero-sum three
player game, by adding a third player that has only one action which always leads
to the initial state of the original game. Finally, at each terminal node, add a reward
for player 3 that is the negative of player 1’s reward. The previous arguments also
apply to this three-player zero-sum game.
Note that in a two-player zero-sum game, if a player is indifferent between ac-
tions at a subsequent node, then his opponent would also be indifferent between the
player’s choice as he would get the same value due to the zero-sum property. Thus,
the players’ values that are backed up by dynamic programming are the same for
any distribution over the players’ same-value actions. Therefore, in finite perfect-
information zero-sum extensive-form games (iterative) deterministic policy itera-
tion converges to a Nash equilibrium after finitely many steps.
Appendix B
Geometric Fictitious Play
According to the common interpretation of fictitious play, players choose (and play)
a best response to their fellow players’ empirical, average behaviour. We propose
an alternative interpretation. Fictitious players have a routine (average) strategy, pik,
that they choose at each iteration. They update their routine strategy by introduc-
ing innovative behaviour, ∆Πk ∈ αk (BR(Πk−1)−Πk), with respect to their fellow
players’ current strategy profile, pik. In particular, innovation slows down over time
as αk decays and the routine strategies, pik, become more sophisticated. This inter-
pretation produces an equivalent sequence of average, routine strategies and thus
follows common fictitious play.
In XFP, players would introduce their (innovative) best response strategy at the
root of the game in proportion to a diminishing fraction (stepsize). This is because
the standard fictitious play update is realization equivalent to a mixed strategy that
samples the previous average strategy and the innovative best response in proportion
to the stepsize. Here, we consider a more aggressive update that introduces local,
sequential best responses at each information state. In particular, we define the local
policy operator,
L
[
β ,pi,s′
]
(a |s) =
β (a |s) for σs
′ ⊆ σs
pi(a |s) otherwise
, (B.1)
that maps two strategies of a player, β i and pi i, and one of their information states, si,
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to a strategy that plays β i at all information states in the (local) subtree rooted at si
and pi i otherwise. Any strategy in
{
L[β ,pi i,si] : β ∈ BRi(pi i)} is a local, sequential
best response of player i from si with routine strategy pi i to their fellow players’
strategy profile pi−i. For a best response Bi ∈BR(Π−i), consider the geometrically-
weighted update,
(1−α)D+1Πi+α
D
∑
d=0
(1−α)d ∑
s∈S id
xΠi(σs)L
[
Bi,Πi,s
]
, (B.2)
where D is the maximum depth of player i’s information-state tree and S id are
their information states at depth d of the tree. Note that, ∑s∈S id xΠi(σs) = 1 and
α∑Dd=0(1−α)d = 1− (1−α)D+1. Geometric Fictitious Play (GFP) is a fictitious
play algorithm that uses this geometrically-weighted update.
While this looks like a busy update, it has a simple interpretation and also an
efficient recursive expression for behavioural strategies. The update is equivalent
to beginning the game with routine strategy, pi i, and at each step in the game, in-
cluding at the root, choosing to switch to the best response for the remainder of the
game with probability α . Accordingly, for an information state s at depth d, the
realization-equivalent behavioural update is
pi(s) ∝ (1−α)d+1xpi(σs)pi(s)+α
d
∑
j=0
(1−α) jxpi (σs[: j])xβ (σs[ j :])︸ ︷︷ ︸
α[σs]
β (s), (B.3)
where σs[: j] is the partial sequence of the first j actions in σs and σs[ j :] = σs \σs[:
j]. Futhermore, the local stepsize, α[σs], can be recursively determined,
α[σsa] = α[σ ]β (a |s)+α(1−α)|σs|+1xpi(σsa), (B.4)
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with α[ /0] = α . Finally, we have
pi(s) ∝ (1−α)dxpi(σs) [(1−α)pi(s)+αβ (s)]+α[σs[: d−1]]β (s)
∝ (1−α)pi(s)+αβ (s)+ c︸︷︷︸
≥0
β (s) for xpi(σs) 6= 0. (B.5)
Thus, Geometric Fictitious Play (GFP)’s local stepsize at each information state is
at least α , wheras XFP’s, αxβ (σs)(1−α)xpi (σs)+αxβ (σs) , is strictly smaller than GFP’s and can
be as small as zero.
Why would we want to apply such an update? The standard XFP update is very
sparse, e.g. for a deterministic best response it updates the policy along only a sin-
gle trajectory in a player’s information state tree. For a stochastic best response, its
realization weight is thinly spread across the tree. GFP, on the other hand, achieves
a minimum update of at least stepsize α at each information state (see Equation
B.5). Furthermore, in addition to XFP’s (global, normal-form) probability of α of
playing the best response, GFP plays additional local best responses with probabil-
ity α(1−α)d from each level d of the tree (see Equation B.2). These local best
responses are distributed across each level in proportion to the routine strategy’s
realization probabilities, thus carrying the updates to the potentially most relevant
states. The result is that the GFP update’s probability of playing the routine strategy
by step d of the game decays exponentially, (1−α)d . In particular, it still plays the
best response with only probability α at the root of the game. Intuitively, we might
be able to get away with these more aggressive updates deeper into the tree, because
these updates have less repercussions for the player’s own subsequent information
states and also their fellow players’ belief states. In our experiments in Section 4.5.2
GFP outperformed XFP in Leduc Hold’em.
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